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INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing debate about whether the United States should
adopt a wealth tax.1 Proponents argue that wealth taxes have the potential
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I thank Larry Zelenak, Reed Shuldiner, Michael
Knoll, Corinna Lain, Jim Hines, Andrew Hayashi, Jim Gibson, Jessica Erickson, and Jake Brooks for
useful feedback; participants at the 2018 NTA Annual Conference on Taxation, the 2018 Junior Faculty
Forum, the 2020 Law and Macro Conference, the William and Mary Law School Seminar, the Temple
University School of Law Seminar, and the University of Richmond Faculty Workshop for helpful
insights and comments; and Andrew Naughton, Amelia Collins, and Austin Chandler for excellent
research assistance. Any errors are my own.
1. There has been an explosion of interest in wealth taxes recently. According to Google Trends,
the three highest peaks in “wealth tax” interest were in November 2019, February 2020, and August 2020.
Wealth Tax Trends, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=
wealth%20tax (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). In the political realm, two Democratic candidates for the 2020
U.S. presidential race proposed wealth taxes. The details of Senator Sanders’ plan may be found here: Tax
on Extreme Wealth, BERNIE SANDERS OFFICIAL WEBSITE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/tax-extremewealth/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). The details of Senator Warren’s may be found here: Ultra-Millionaire
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to reduce resource and political inequality and may thus be potent
instruments of equity.2 Indeed, most if not all the arguments in favor of a
broad-based wealth tax follow from their capacity to alleviate a systemic
imbalance between rich and poor. What has gone unrecognized is that
there is an alternative policy rationale for wealth taxes: to counteract a
systemic imbalance between past generations and future generations.3
A generational imbalance is not merely an academic possibility. For
decades, the U.S. has borrowed money to pay for its expenditures.4 And
budget forecasts make it all but inevitable that at some point the rate of
borrowing must slow, meaning that either taxes must go up, or
government spending must go down.5 To be sure, while in the throes of a
pandemic is hardly the time to worry about long-term budget imbalances,
and the preponderance of the evidence shows that a debt crisis is not

Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited Feb. 20,
2021). And in the academic realm, a broad range of scholars are studying the effects, potential, and
limitations of wealth taxes. See generally Florian Scheuer & Joel Slemrod, Taxing Our Wealth, 35 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 207, 219 (2021).
2. Id. See also Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Progressive wealth taxation, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (Sep. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/progressivewealth-taxation/. But see HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 495-97 (3d ed. 2008).
3. Whenever the interests of different generations compete, intergenerational equity concerns
arise. When earlier generations are subject to a relatively favorable tax regime and later generations are
subject to a far more burdensome tax regime, an intergenerational imbalance manifests. There are two
underlying rationales for intergenerational equity claims in government budget contexts. First, one might
claim that each generation has an obligation to pass along a fisc to its predecessors no worse than the one
it inherited. This raises numerous issues, including how to define a worse fisc when historically each
generation has been wealthier than its forebearers and how to take into consideration the substantial
uncertainty over the future. Second, one might claim that each generation should pay for whatever it uses.
This rationale too raises issues, including how to measure and assign the benefit of government
expenditure to all taxpayers past, present, and future. See Janna Thompson, Intergenerational Equity:
Issues of Principle in the Allocation of Social Resources Between this Generation and the Next,
(Parliament of Australia Information and Research Services Research Paper No. 7 2002-03), available at
https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/2002-03/03rp07.pdf. Despite the difficulties associated
with intergenerational equity analysis, it remains an important fairness concept. See generally Neil H.
Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237 (2009) [hereinafter:
“Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations”].
4. See infra Part II.A. Since the early 1980s, the United States government has borrowed trillions
of dollars to cover its budget shortfalls. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA,
https://www.cbo.gov/data/budget-economic-data#2. The deficits started in the late 1960s but became
much larger in the 1980s. The two recent changes to the U.S. government budget that have had the largest
impact on the debt are the trillions the government has prudently borrowed and spent to mitigate the fallout
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lost revenue from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. See CONG. BUDGET
OFF.,
MONTHLY
BUDGET
REVIEW
FOR
JULY
2020
(Aug.
10,
2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-08/56497-CBO-MBR.pdf; See William G. Gale et al., Effects of
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Preliminary Analysis, TAX POL’Y CTR. 8 (June 13, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/effects-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-preliminary-analysis.
5. See infra Part II.B. Despite its prodigious size and persistent growth, the U.S. government debt
has not captured the public’s attention and for the most part its study has been relegated to the ivory tower.
See Alan J. Auerbach & William G. Gale, Forgotten but Not Gone: The Long-Term Fiscal Imbalance,
TAX NOTES 1555 (Sept. 29, 2014).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss3/1

2

Schaffa: The Intergenerational Equity Case for a Wealth Tax

2022]

INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY

737

imminent.6 The U.S. has an enormous capacity to borrow—truly without
historical analog.7 But its capacity to borrow is not infinite.8 There is a
limit, and the U.S. government is borrowing at an unsustainable clip.9
The way in which the government reduces the deficit will have a
substantial effect on the intergenerational distribution of economic
outcomes. The government could, for example, reduce the deficit with
gradual tax increases, introduced over several years. Alternatively, the
government could reduce the deficit with a large abrupt tax increase,
which would likely result if the unsustainable deficit precipitated a fiscal
or economic crisis.10 If there is an abrupt tax increase, there will be a clear
demarcation between two tax regime eras. In the first, the government
will have financed a large portion of spending with borrowing and levied
low taxes; in the second, the government will have decreased its
borrowing and levied higher taxes.11 Even accounting for the historical
tendency for each generation to have more income than its predecessors,
such an abrupt tax increase could result in an intergenerational
imbalance.12 If that comes to pass, U.S. fiscal policy will have caused
intergenerational inequity.
I suggest a simple remedy to counteract the intergenerational
consequences of this change in tax regimes: a one-time wealth tax. Older
cohorts of taxpayers had a relatively low tax burden because the
government borrowed to finance spending, and coincidentally older
cohorts hold relatively more wealth.13 Moreover, because income and
wealth are correlated, the more a taxpayer benefitted from a lower income
tax burden, the more wealth she will, on average, have.14 A one-time
wealth tax would raise revenue from taxpayers roughly in proportion to
the benefit they received from government deficit spending and would
thus distribute taxpayer burdens more equitably if the government must
reign in its borrowing abruptly.15
6. Many economists argue that spending to counteract the pandemic is prudent. See Heather
Long, $900 billion stimulus is second-biggest in U.S. history, but it won’t last long enough, WASH. POST
(Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/21/stimulus-bill-economy/.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part II.A. In 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic, 22.1% of U.S. federal
government spending was financed by borrowing, a deficit that has persistently increased over that past
several decades. And during the pandemic, borrowing rose to 50.1% of spending. See An Update to
Budget Outlook: 2020 to 2030, Cong. Budget Off. 6 (Sept. 2020), https
://www.cbo.gov/publication/56542.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the necessary
background to understand government budgets, focusing particularly on
the economic limits of debt and the difference between sustainable and
unsustainable government deficits. Part II describes the U.S.’s recent
history of deficit spending, its current fiscal condition, and its projected
economic position. Part II also explains why the deficit must be reduced
and how the timing of this reduction will change economic outcomes. Part
III suggests criteria to determine whether a government policy has
violated intergenerational equity. It then discusses the various factors that
would affect the intergenerational distribution of economic outcomes and
provides an example of an intergenerational equity violation. Part IV
demonstrates how a one-time wealth tax would rebalance the tax burden
across generations of taxpayers, moving us closer to intergenerational
equity.
I. GOVERNMENT BUDGETS
To begin this analysis of the U.S.’s debt and deficit, this Part describes
the basics of government budgets, explores the benefits, costs, and limits
of government debt, and explains the differences between unsustainable
and sustainable deficits. This sets the stage for Part II, which applies these
concepts to the debt and deficit of the U.S.
A. The Debt and the Deficit
The U.S. Government has revenues and outlays.16 Its outlays are
partitioned into three categories: mandatory, discretionary, and net
interest.17 Mandatory outlays are required by statute and include Social
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and a few smaller government programs.18
Discretionary outlays constitute spending on all other government
programs, notably including defense expenditures.19 Net interest is the
interest the U.S. government pays to service its debt obligations less the
interest it receives from various sources as a creditor.20
When government outlays exceed government revenues in a given

16. Most of the revenues the U.S. federal government collects are from various taxes. The three
largest revenue sources are individual income taxes, payroll taxes, and corporate income taxes. CONG.
BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2021 TO 2031 1-2 (Feb. 2021),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56970.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1, 4.
19. Id. at 1, 6.
20. See id. at 15.
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year, the U.S. has a deficit.21 When government revenues exceed outlays,
the U.S. has a surplus. In deficit years, the government must borrow
money to balance its budget. Setting aside some curious accounting rules,
the government debt is the sum of all prior government deficits.22 In the
same vein, the deficit is the change in government debt from one year to
the next.23
To aid in the analysis of government finances, the total deficit is often
partitioned. The primary deficit is the total deficit less net interest. 24 In
other words, the primary deficit is the amount the government borrows
for new spending. If the government decided to roll over its debt including
new interest but not borrow any additional funds, the primary deficit
would be zero, and the total deficit would equal net interest.
The deficit may also be subdivided into structural and cyclical
components.25 Because government finances are interconnected with the
economy, government deficits are affected by the economy’s business
cycle. Even if government policy remains unchanged over the business
cycle, the deficit will mechanically increase during recessions as tax bases

21. See id. at 6. This analysis examines only the federal budget. U.S. federal government
borrowing is substantially larger than U.S. state government borrowing at least in part because of state
balanced budget requirements. See James R. Hines Jr., State Fiscal Policies and Transitory Income
Fluctuations, 41 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 313, 314-15 (2010).
22. For example, some federal credit programs, including student loans, are not included. See
CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2020 TO 2030 10 (Jan. 2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56020. Moreover, as economist Marty Feldstein first noted, the U.S. has
made enormous financial commitments that are not captured in its debt numbers, including Social Security
and Medicare. See Martin Feldstein, Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital
Accumulation, 82 J. POL. ECON. 905, 920 (1974). The present value of future payroll tax collections is
less than the present value of future benefit payouts as mandated by current law. See Stephen C. Goss,
The Future Financial Status of the Social Security Program, 70 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 111, 111
(2010); Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale & Aaron Krupkin, If Not Now, When? New Estimates of the
Federal Budget Outlook, BROOKINGS REP. 9 (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/if-notnow-when-new-estimates-of-the-federal-budget-outlook/. This creates an additional “off balance sheet”
liability that the debt and deficit numbers do not capture.
23. Debt and deficit numbers often do not include intragovernmental debt. Instead of depositing
the cash collected from payroll taxes into the trust funds out of which Social Security and Medicare
benefits are paid, the government writes itself an IOU that does not count towards the headline government
debt number. This is intragovernmental debt. But when the government pays out benefits, it cannot use
these IOUs and so must borrow more. These intergovernmental holdings increase the government debt by
$5.89 trillion to $26.49 trillion. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, BEA 20-37, GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT, 2ND QUARTER 2020 (ADVANCE ESTIMATE) AND ANNUAL UPDATE (July 2020),
https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-2nd-quarter-2020-advance-estimate-andannual-update.
24. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2020 TO 2030 1 (Jan. 2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56020.
25. See Structural Deficits: What Are They, Why Do We Have One, and Why Should We Worry
About It?, CONCORD COALITION, Feb. 27, 2012, at 1, https://www.concordcoalition.org
/sites/default/files/structuraldeficits_0.pdf.
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diminish and government programs experience increase use.26 Beyond
that mechanical deficit increase, the government may choose to finance
programs to counteract the recession, further increasing the deficit.27 This
is the cyclical component of the deficit. The structural component of the
deficit is the amount the government borrows that cannot be attributed to
the business cycle.28 Loosely speaking, the structural deficit is
government borrowing attributable to its ongoing programs.
Debt is an advantageous tool that the government can and should use
to advance the interests of its citizens. From time to time, the U.S.
government makes large and irregular purchases, for example to
counteract an exigency, stabilize the economy, or make a substantial
investment for the public good.29 Debt furnishes the government with
budgetary flexibility, allowing the government to spread the cost of these
large expenditures.30
Without the ability to borrow or access to a surplus fund, the
government would be unable to make these expenditures or would have
to raise taxes to cover the cost of large purchases as they were made,
26. See Hines, supra note 21, at 318-21 and Structural Deficits: What Are They, Why Do We Have
One, and Why Should We Worry About It?, CONCORD COALITION, Feb. 27, 2012, at 1-2,
https://www.concordcoalition.org/sites/default/files/structuraldeficits_0.pdf. Stated differently, compared
to long-run trends, deficits are smaller during expansions and larger during recessions. Naïve
policymakers seem to miscomprehend the severity of the deficit in expansions. See Auerbach, Gale, &
Krupkin, supra note 22, at 2. In any event, fiscal discipline has been noticeably lacking in the United
States, resulting in deficits that stubbornly refuse to shrink. The tendency for political forces to generate
large government deficits is called “deficit bias.” See DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED MACROECONOMICS
579-82 (3d ed. 2005).
27. See Lawrence Summers, Why America Must Have a Fiscal Stimulus, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan.
6, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/3b3bd570-bc76-11dc-bcf9-0000779fd2ac.
28. The items that have received most attention as recent and expected future contributors to the
structural deficit are (1) the growing cost of large entitlement programs, including Social Security and
Medicare; (2) the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and (3) and tax cuts. See Structural Deficits:
What Are They, Why Do We Have One, and Why Should We Worry About It?, CONCORD COALITION, 23 (Feb. 27, 2012),https://www.concordcoalition.org/sites/default/files/structuraldeficits_0.pdf.
29. For example, the Louisiana purchase was financed by debt. Secretary of the Treasury,
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, https://www.nps.gov/frhi/learn/historyculture/secretaryofthetreasury.
htm#:~:text=In%201803%20the%20government%20increased,plan%20for%20the%20nation's%20econ
omy. And within the first eight months of the COVID-19 pandemic, government expenditures increased
by $2.59 trillion. See How is the federal government funding relief efforts for COVID-19?, DATALAB,
https://datalab.usaspending.gov/federal-covid-funding/ (last visited March 8, 2022).
30. This is called tax smoothing. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 573-77. A second important benefit
is that government debt vastly increases the government’s capacity to engage in both fiscal and monetary
stabilization. Government borrowing can increase the amount of GDP spent on consumption. See Jason
Furman and Lawrence Summers, Draft, A Reconsideration of Fiscal Policy in the Era of Low Interest
Rates
34
(Peterson
Inst.
For
Int’l
Econ.,
Discussion
Draft,
2020),
https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/furman-summers2020-12-01paper.pdf. And government
debt plays a central role in the Federal Reserve’s control over the money supply. See David Andolfatto &
Li Li, Is the Fed Monetizing Government Debt?, 5 ECONOMIC SYNOPSES 1 (2013),
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2013/02/01/is-the-fed-monetizinggovernment-debt/.
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which would have several drawbacks.31 First, it would create tax burden
uncertainty. Taxpayers would have higher tax bills in years afflicted with
natural disasters, pandemics, or recessions, because each of those
scenarios would warrant costly government intervention. But taxpayers
could hardly be forewarned of these expenditures and would thus
perpetually save for and dread the possibility of an unusually large tax
bill.32
Second, most often the government would have to levy additional taxes
precisely when it would be most painful to do so. Raising taxes during a
recession or a pandemic would, in large part, nullify the benefit of the
increased government expenditure designed to alleviate the burdens of
that exigency. For example, the vast majority of the U.S. government’s
pandemic costs stem from its efforts to provide economic relief and
security. Without debt or a surplus fund, any relief would simply be
redistribution between current taxpayers.33
Third, tax burdens would become arbitrary, creating fairness concerns.
Consider, for example, two taxpayers identical in every way except that
one is a year older and thus retires just before a pandemic starts, and the
other retires one year later. Assuming the government financed its
response to the pandemic with an income tax, the former would avoid a
large tax burden that would fall on the latter. This would violate important
fairness principles, including ability to pay.34
Fourth, and perhaps most important, historically the government’s
capacity to borrow in the short run has been larger than its ability to raise
taxes.35 Thus, preventing the government from using debt financing
31. This might be somewhat alleviated if the government regularly ran surpluses anticipating costly
crises. But this would come with its own political economy challenges and efficiency costs. Since the
government would likely opt to expend these surpluses quickly in response to a crisis, it might not be able
to invest them. Consider the consequences if the government suddenly needed a trillion dollars for a
surplus fund. This would require a trillion-dollar divestment which would surely have economic
consequences. Moreover, the government would still be constrained to spend no more than it had saved
or could raise in taxes.
32. For example, within the first eight months of the COVID-19 pandemic, government
expenditures increased by $2.59 trillion. See DATALAB, supra note 29. Even disregarding the large
structural deficits, taxpayers would have suffered an 74% average increase in their tax bills to cover the
cost of the pandemic response.
33. This issue is exacerbated because, during economic crises, government revenue is sure to fall
as most tax bases diminish, including income, sales, property values, and imports. See Hines, supra note
21, at 319-21.
34. Ability to pay stands for the proposition that taxpayers should contribute to government
revenues in proportion to their means. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 242-43 (3d ed. 1980). If the only difference between the taxpayers were one
year of age, a policy that would place a substantially larger burden on one than the other would violate
the horizontal equity aspect of ability to pay. Id.
35. As noted above, the U.S. government borrowed an additional $2.59 trillion dollars within the
first eight months of the pandemic, which would equate to a 74% increase in tax revenue—well beyond
what the political constraints of the U.S. would allow.
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would limit its ability to respond to various crises. All that is to say,
government debt is an important and beneficial tool, and there is generally
no reason to prohibit the government from using it.
B. The Economic Limit of the Debt
The government’s power to borrow is useful but not infinite. There is
an economic limit to how much debt the U.S. government can
accumulate.36 Creditors only lend to the U.S. because they believe they
will be repaid with interest.37 The U.S. can raise funds to make real
payments to creditors by running a surplus or by borrowing more. But if
the debt is so large that the government’s net interest exceeds what it can
raise in taxes, then the only avenue for real repayment is additional
borrowing, a scenario in which holding government debt becomes
analogous to investing in a Ponzi scheme.38 As long as the government
can find another lender, anyone holding government debt will be repaid.
This is not a stable equilibrium. As soon as an investor realizes that
repayment is contingent on finding additional investors, she will sell her
government debt holdings. As more and more investors do this, the value
of government debt will plummet, and the government will be unable to
borrow any more. To be sure, no one knows at what debt level the market
for government debt collapses, but it is paramount to understand that there
is a limit.39
36. To get a sense of what this upper bound might be, let 𝜃 be the maximum fraction of its revenue
the government could use to pay interest; 𝜏 be the highest fraction of GDP that the government could
collect in tax revenue; 𝑌 be GDP; 𝑟 be the average interest rate on government debt; and 𝐷 be government
debt. The maximum revenue that the government could collect would then be 𝜏𝑌, the maximum interest
payment the government could make would be 𝜃𝜏𝑌, and the government’s interest expense would be 𝑟𝐷.
To prevent government debt from becoming a Ponzi scheme, the condition 𝜃𝜏𝑌 > 𝑟𝐷 must hold. Dividing
both sides by 𝑟 and 𝑌 yields 𝜃𝜏/𝑟 > 𝐷/𝑌. In words, this inequality states that the debt-to-GDP ratio
cannot exceed the maximum fraction of GDP that can be used to pay government debt interest divided by
the interest rate.
37. To be clear, government debt never has to be repaid—it may be rolled over indefinitely. See
RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 706 (3d
ed. 1980). But the government must maintain its capacity to repay or else there will be a crisis.
38. The US government requires willing investors to issue more debt. ROMER, supra note 26, at
607-12. Moreover, a crisis is likely to come about suddenly. As investors come to believe that holding
debt is risky, they will require higher interest rates. A higher interest rate will increase the government’s
interest expense, which will make it more difficult to repay the debt, which, again, will require an increase
in the interest rate; so on and so forth. As this this happens the debt market quickly spirals into collapse.
Id.
39. See Noah Smith, No one knows how much the government can borrow, NEWSBLUR (Jan. 22,
2021), https://www.newsblur.com/newsletters/story/8065617:2686b6. Smith highlights that knowing the
debt limit would require an understanding of (1) at what point investors would be unwilling to hold
government debt, even with higher interest rates, and (2) how much additional debt the Federal Reserve
could hold before the increase in the money supply would cause substantial inflation. The best forecasts
we have for exactly what debt level would cause the market to collapse rest upon various conflicting
pieces of evidence.
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If the U.S. opted not to repay its creditors by running surpluses or with
additional borrowing, then it would have only two options, both
deleterious: print money or default.40 Printing money to repay creditors
generally results in hyperinflation and often economic collapse.41 Indeed,
hyperinflation is generally caused by unsustainable deficits.42 And
ultimately, the most successful countermeasure to hyperinflation is the
elimination of the budget deficit, which would require a substantial and
abrupt tax increase or spending cut.43
The other option, default, is no more attractive. There are many reasons
why the U.S. should not default on the debt.44 First, over 70% of U.S.
government debt is held by U.S. private and public entities.45 Defaulting
would diminish the value of (1) privately held American wealth, (2) the
assets in the trust funds from which the government pays Social Security
and Medicare benefits, and (3) the assets held by the Federal Reserve.
Second, sovereign default is often accompanied by a banking crisis and
other economic maladies.46 Third, default would lock the U.S.
40. To be clear: the U.S. does not print money to repay creditors. The Federal Reserve places
orders for hard currency with the Treasury based on currency circulation and currency destruction rates.
See Currency Print Orders: 2022 Federal Reserve Note Print Order, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coin_currency_orders.htm (last visited Aug.
15, 2020). Separately, the Federal Reserve uses monetary policy to change the available money supply
(mostly money in accounts, not hard currency), most often by buying and selling assets on the open
market. See What is the difference between monetary policy and fiscal policy, and how are they related?,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12855.htm
(last visited Aug. 15, 2020). When the government requires additional funds for expenditures, it borrows.
41. Governments generally print money to repay debts after they have run large budget deficits in
response to a crisis, such as war. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 538-39. The countries that have attempted
this include Germany in 1921-1923, Zimbabwe in 2007-2009, and Venezuela currently. See Scott A.
Wolla and Kaitlyn Frerking, Making Sense of the National Debt, ECON. RSCH. FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST.
LOUIS: PAGE ONE ECONS. (Nov. 2019), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1econ/2019/11/01/making-sense-of-the-national-debt.
42. See Miguel A. Kiguel, Budget Deficits, Stability, and the Monetary Dynamics of
Hyperinflation, 21 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 148, 148 (May, 1989).
43. Id. at 154. See also ROMER, supra note 26, at 538-39.
44. There is widespread consensus that a default, or even a selective default, would be very
harmful. This has not prevented uninformed politicians from speculating about default as a possibility.
See Martha C. White, Should the U.S. refuse to pay back its $1 trillion debt to China?, NBC NEWS (Jun.
11 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/should-u-s-refuse-pay-back-its-1-trillion-debtn1227351.
45. Jeffry Bartash, Here’s who owns a record $21.21 trillion of U.S. debt, MARKET WATCH (Aug.
23, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-who-owns-a-record-2121-trillion-of-us-debt-201808-21. Currently only $7.07 trillion of the government debt is held by foreigners. See Major Foreign
Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://ticdata.treasury.gov
/Publish/mfh.txt (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
46. It’s not clear whether a banking crisis follows from sovereign default, whether a banking crisis
causes sovereign default, or whether some other factors cause both sovereign default and a banking crisis.
But the correlation alone suggests that governments should avoid default. See Eduardo Borensztein &
Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, 56 IMF STAFF PAPERS 683, 713 (2009). See also Guido
Sandleris, The Costs of Sovereign Default: Theory and Empirical Evidence 16 ECONOMÍA 1 (2016).
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government out of credit markets and increase the U.S. cost of
borrowing.47
A useful way to think about the size and limit of government debt is
the debt-to-GDP ratio.48 The government’s debt-to-GDP ratio combines
the government’s debt and the country’s GDP into a single measure which
reports how much debt the government has for each dollar of GDP. A
government’s capacity to take on debt increases with GDP because most
tax bases, and certainly the largest ones, correlate to GDP. 49 While GDP
should certainly not be thought of as the government’s income, a higher
GDP implies a greater government potential to raise future revenue and
thus take on more debt.50 The ratio also facilitates comparisons between
countries and across time. Higher GDP countries, all other things equal,
should be able to take on larger debts.51 And since GDPs and debts change
over time, the debt-to-GDP ratio provides some sense of how a country’s
capacity to take on additional debt has changed over time.52
Notably, the debt-to-GDP ratio can fall even if government debt grows
but only if GDP grows faster than the debt. For example, if GDP and debt
are both $100, then the debt-to-GDP ratio is $100/$100=1. If the debt
grows at a rate of 1% per year, which means the government has run a
deficit, and GDP grows at a rate of 2% per year, then in the following year
the ratio will be $101/$102. Despite the fact that the government ran a
deficit, the government’s capacity to borrow increased. In this particular

47. On average, countries that default regain some credit market access after 5.7 years and full
market access after 8.4 years. See Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 46, at 699. Recent sovereign defaults
have increased the cost of borrowing by 20 basis points on average. Id. at 702. However, historically
defaults have increased the cost of borrowing by much more. Id. at 703.
48. A country’s GDP is its aggregate income. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF
MACROECONOMICS 24 (5th ed. 2009). Several tax scholars have suggested alternative measures to express
the state of the government’s finances. Laurence Kotlikoff suggests Generational Accounting. See
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, From deficit delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule: Looking for an economically
meaningful way to assess fiscal policy, 58 J. OF ECON. 17 (1993). Daniel Shaviro suggests a measure
called “tax lag”. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, DO DEFICITS MATTER? (1997). Jason Furman and Larry Summers
argue that the debt-to-GDP ratio is a mismatch between a stock and a flow number. They suggest instead
that GDP should be compared to interest expense and the debt should be compared to the present value
of GDP. See Furman & Summers, supra note 30, at 3.
49. GDP is often subdivided into four categories: consumption, investment, government
purchases, and net exports. See MANKIW, supra note 48. Income and consumption are ubiquitous tax
bases that together account for a large fraction of government revenue in many countries. See JOEL
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 18 (5th
ed. 2017).
50. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 560-61.
51. The debt-to-GDP ratio for OECD countries ranges from .25 to 2.58. The United States is closer
to the high end at 1.62. See General Government Debt, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/gga/generalgovernment-debt.htm (last accessed Mar. 21, 2022).
52. Since 1980, the trend of the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio has been up. See Federal Debt: Total
Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, FRED ECONOMIC DATA,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S.
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example the government’s debt could grow up to 2% without impairing
its capacity to borrow.
If the GDP growth rate exceeds the interest rate, then the government
may run a primary deficit without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio.53 If
the interest rate exceeds the GDP growth rate, then the government must
pay down its debt (i.e., run a surplus) or else its debt-to-GDP ratio will
increase. Returning to our example, if GDP grows at 2%, and the interest
rate is 1%, then the government may run a primary deficit of up to 1% of
the debt without impairing its ability to repay. If the interest rate is exactly
2%, then non-interest expenditure cannot exceed government revenue
without impairing the government’s ability to repay. And if the interest
rate is above 2%, then government revenue must exceed non-interest
government expenditure or else the debt-to-GDP ratio will grow.
Until recently, the prevailing economic wisdom suggested that GDP
growth rates were unlikely to exceed government debt interest rates for
long periods of time.54 This meant that governments needed to run
primary surpluses to increase their capacity to borrow in the future.
However, recent empirical analyses have shown that for many countries
with advanced economies, GDP growth rates have more often than not
exceeded government interest rates.55 If this is correct, it has notable
implications for what level of deficit is sustainable. In particular, it raises
the possibility that government debt may be rolled over for the foreseeable
future as long as primary deficits remain small.56 If, however, the
53. Since there is uncertainty over both future government interest rates and future GDP growth,
a more sophisticated approach might be to estimate the expected fiscal cost using a distribution of possible
future interest rates and growth rates.
54. When the GDP growth rate exceeds the government interest rate, it might be evidence that the
economy is suffering from inefficient oversaving, an economic malady called dynamic inefficiency.
However, economic models that include uncertainty have shown that a GDP growth rate above the
government interest rate without dynamic inefficiency is possible. ROMER, supra note 26, at 563-64.
55. Since 1950 nominal GDP average growth rates have been larger than average nominal interest
rates on 1-year and 10-year government bonds in the U.S. See Olivier Blanchard, Public Debt and Low
Interest Rates, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 1197, 1202 (2019). Moreover, forecasts suggest that interest rates are
likely to remain below GDP growth rates for the US, the UK, the Euro Zone, and Japan at least for the
near future. Id. at 1198; see also Furman & Summers, supra note 30, at 4-8. The U.S. never paid off what
it borrowed to finance its World War II expenditures, but its capacity to borrow, nonetheless, was restored
as the GDP growth rate exceeded the interest rate, more often than not, for several subsequent decades.
See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 707
(3d ed. 1980). However, between 1945 and 1975, the U.S. often ran budget surpluses, and, during its
deficit years, it borrowed relatively little. See Federal Surplus or Deficit, FRED ECONOMIC DATA,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSD#0.
56. Moreover, as the debt is rolled over, the debt-to-GDP ratio will decrease, meaning that there
may be no fiscal cost to public debt. See Blanchard, supra note 55, at 1205. Low interest rates also have
favorable implications for the welfare cost of public debt. Id. at 1225. This is, in part, why there is a
consensus among economists that the U.S. should spend with an open hand to counteract the economic
fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, and why several economists argue that the U.S. should take
advantage of low interest rates to spend on public goods such as infrastructure. See Long, supra note 6,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/21/stimulus-bill-economy/; Furman & Summers,
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government runs large primary deficits in addition to rolling over its
debts, then its debt-to-GDP ratio will grow. As the debt-to-GDP ratio
grows, the interest rate on government debt will also grow.57 Eventually,
the interest rate will surpass the GDP growth rate, at which point the
government will no longer be able to roll over its debt indefinitely.58
C. Sustainable and Unsustainable Deficits
An ongoing primary deficit is sustainable if it will not cause the debtto-GDP ratio to grow without bound. An ongoing primary deficit is
unsustainable if it will cause the debt-to-GDP ratio to grow without
bound. If the interest rate on government debt exceeds the GDP growth
rate, no primary deficit is sustainable. Assuming the government is a
going concern, it must run primary surpluses in at least some future years
to prevent the debt-to-GDP ratio from growing without bound. If, on the
other hand, the GDP growth rate exceeds the interest rate on government
debt, the government has substantially more fiscal latitude. As noted
above, if the government does not run a primary deficit, its debt-to-GDP
ratio will fall over time because GDP is growing faster than its debt.
Now consider two scenarios, described in the table below, in which the
government does run a primary deficit. In the first, the government has to
borrow 12% of GDP every 11 years to counteract some exigency, such as
a financial crisis or a pandemic—i.e., the government runs a cyclical
primary deficit. In the second scenario, the government borrows 3.3% of
GDP every year to finance ongoing expenditures—i.e., the government
runs a structural primary deficit.59

supra note 30, at 34. But see Michael Boskin, Are Large Deficits and Debt Dangerous?, (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26727, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26727, for a discussion
of controversial assumptions that Blanchard makes.
57. Investors demand a higher interest rate to lend to borrowers with large pre-existing debts.
While interest rates generally have decreased over the past few decades, several empirical studies have
shown that after accounting for the general decrease in interest rates, the interest rate on U.S. debt has
increased with the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio.
58. At this point, there will be a fiscal cost to debt. In other words, the government will eventually
have to raise taxes or lower expenditures to cover interest payments.
59. These numbers were not selected at random. The U.S.’s current debt-to-GDP ratio is roughly
1.3; U.S. nominal GDP growth has been approximately 4% recently; the nominal interest rate on
government debt has been approximately 3% recently; the primary deficit in the 2010s was approximately
3.3% of GDP; there were 11 years between the peak of the 2009 financial crisis and the peak of the
COVID-19 pandemic; the U.S. spent less than 12% of GDP to mitigate the fallout from the Great
Recession, but more to counteract the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. All that is to say, this
example essentially partitions the U.S. primary deficit into its cyclical and structural parts to highlight
how the cyclical part is sustainable, but the structural part is not. The simulation assumes that the interest
rate on government debt grows 3 basis points for every percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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Simulation Parameters

Initial debt-to-GDP ratio
GDP growth rate
Initial interest rate
Primary deficit (% of GDP)
Frequency of deficit

Structural

Cyclical

1.3
4%
3%
3.3%
Every year

1.3
4%
3%
12%
Every 11 years

The graph below plots the debt-to-GDP ratio over time for these two
scenarios in addition to the debt-to-GDP ratio over time with no primary
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deficit.
As the graph shows, a cyclical primary deficit of 12% of GDP every
11 years is sustainable. Even without ever retiring any debt or paying off
any interest, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls, albeit very gradually, over the
long term. A structural primary deficit of 3.3%, however, is unsustainable.
The structural deficit causes the debt to grow faster than GDP, meaning
that the debt-to-GDP ratio will grow until it hits its economic limit.
This does not mean that all structural primary deficits are
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unsustainable.60 Nor does this suggest that cyclical deficits are better than
structural deficits. A sufficiently high cyclical deficit would also cause
the debt-to-GDP ratio to grow without bound. Nor does this imply that a
government must choose between running a structural or a cyclical
deficit—a government may run both types of deficits indefinitely if they
are sufficiently small. However, cyclical deficits cannot be avoided
without increasing taxes or lowering spending during a crisis. Thus,
sustainable budget policy is likely to require small primary structural
deficits (perhaps even primary surpluses) to ensure imperative large
cyclical deficits remain sustainable.
D. The Costs of Government Debt
The cost of government debt depends on whether the primary deficit,
including both structural and cyclical components, is sustainable or not.
If the deficit is sustainable, then the debt and any accruing interest may
be rolled over indefinitely. In that case, government borrowing has no
fiscal cost, although it may have other costs.61
If the primary deficit is unsustainable, then government borrowing has
substantially higher costs. First, the more the government borrows now,
the less it can borrow in the future. In other words, borrowing later is an
opportunity cost to borrowing today. Because there is a limit to what
governments can borrow, an unsustainable deficit cannot be run
indefinitely. Eventually, the government must reduce the amount it
borrows. Countries with less capacity to borrow are said to have less fiscal
space.62 The cost of less fiscal space is most apparent when a country

60. In this example, a primary deficit of up to 1% of the debt would not cause the debt-to-GDP
ratio to climb. The interest rate causes the debt to grow by 3%. It can thus grow by up to an additional 1%
without growing faster than 4%, the GDP growth rate.
61. Even if debt has no fiscal cost, it may have a welfare cost. Funding the government with
borrowing instead of tax revenue likely reduces private investment because lower tax rates increase the
incentive to consume. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 568-69. The effect will vary depending on whether
the tax lower tax burden falls on capital or labor income, and there may be a short-run crowd-in effect.
See Nora Traum & Shu‐Chun S. Yang, When Does Government Debt Crowd Out Investment?, 30 J.
APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 24 (2015). More generally, government debt may crowd out private investment.
See ROMER, supra note 26, at 568-69. However, if the GDP growth rate exceeds the government interest
rate, the welfare cost may be small. See Blanchard, supra note 55, at 1205. And if the economy is in a
recession the likelihood and cost of crowding out is much lower. Neil Buchanan, Generational Theft: U.S.
Fiscal Policy Does Not Cheat Future Generations, 52 CHALLENGE 44, 50-51 (2009) [hereinafter:
“Buchanan, U.S. Fiscal Policy Does Not Cheat Future Generations].
62. Lower fiscal space means a reduced capacity to raise spending or lower taxes without
jeopardizing fiscal sustainability. See M. Ayhan Kose et al., Fiscal Space: Concept, Measurement, and
Policy Implications, 19 WORLD BANK GROUP RESEARCH & POLICY BRIEFS 1, 1 (2018). However, the
exact mechanism by which higher debt levels reduce fiscal space is not entirely clear. See Christina Romer
& David Romer, Fiscal Space and the Aftermath of Financial Crises: How It Matters and Why, 2019
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 239.
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suffers a crisis. Historically, countries with low debt-to-GDP ratios tend
to have relatively modest economic downturns, whereas countries with
high ratios tend to experience large and long-lasting reductions in
income.63
Second, as noted above, higher debt levels increase government
interest rates.64 Investors require a higher interest rate to lend to borrowers
with large pre-existing debts because the riskiness of a loan increases with
the amount of debt the borrower is already saddled with.65 For
government debt purposes, this means the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio,
the higher the interest rate on new debt.66 While interest rates generally
have decreased over the past few decades, several empirical studies have
shown that after accounting for the general decrease in interest rates, the
interest rate on U.S. debt has increased with the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio.67
If the interest rate is greater than the GDP growth rate, then the debt will
accrue a fiscal cost.68
Third, high debt levels may lead to costly political frictions. The debt

63. The evidence supporting this claim controls for several possible confounding factors. See
Christina Romer and David Romer, supra note 62, at 240. High debt levels increase the likelihood of a
financial crisis, including legal or economic default. See Auerbach, Gale & Krupkin, supra note 22, at 2.
Inflation can lower, in real terms, the payments required to satisfy a country’s sovereign debt. Economists
consider this default. See John H. Cochrane, Smith, MMT, and Science in Economics, THE GRUMPY
ECONOMIST (May 5, 2019), https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2019/05/smith-mmt-and-science-ineconomics.html. This may, however, not violate a contract and, as such, may not constitute legal default.
See IMF Conference on Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and Practitioners, Chapter 7: Sovereign
Default 9 n. 11 (Sept. 13-14, 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Seminars/Conferences
/2018/05/24/sovereign-debt-a-guide-for-economists-and-practitioners. Several countries have done this.
See id.
64. See Auerbach, Gale, & Krupkin, supra note 22, at 2. At higher debt levels, investors demand
a higher default premium to compensate for higher default risk. See IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE
110-12 (4th ed. 2017).
65. Id.
66. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 608.
67. Estimates for the effect of a higher debt-to-GDP ratio on the interest rate vary. Typical
estimates are that a one percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio increases the interest rate on
government debt by 2 to 5.6 basis points. See, e.g., Thomas Laubach, New Evidence on the Interest Rate
Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt, 7 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 858 (June 2009); See Eric M. Engen & R.
Glenn Hubbard, Federal Government Debt and Interest Rates, 19 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 83
(2004); and Gabriel Ehrlich & Aditi Thapar, Public Debt Levels and Real Interest Rates: Causal Evidence
from Parliamentary Elections, SSRN (May 17, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3603563. Relatedly, another empirical study shows that the spread between Aaa long-term corporate
bonds and long-term treasuries tends to decrease as the debt-to-GDP ratio increases. See Arvind
Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt, 120 J. OF
POLITICAL ECON. 233, 234 (2012).
68. If the interest rate exceeds the GDP growth rate, the government will at some point have to
pay at least some of the interest that accrues on the debt. If the government is unable to roll over its debt,
then its only options are default or repayment with printed money. Both of these options have dire
consequences. See infra Part I.B.
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ceiling crisis in 2011-2012 is a recent example.69 U.S. law gives Congress
the ultimate authority over how much the U.S. can borrow.70 Republicans
in Congress attempted to use this legal requirement as leverage to achieve
political objectives.71 The GAO found that the 2011-2012 debt ceiling
crisis resulted in additional borrowing costs totaling $1.3 billion over that
time period.72 These costs are likely only a small fraction of the total cost
because they do not include any losses suffered after the crisis was
resolved, the opportunity costs of the president and Congress (whose time
could have been spent, one would hope, more productively), nor the
broader costs to the economy.73
In sum, debt is a useful and beneficial tool that the government can and
should use to advance the interests of its citizens. But the debt has an
economic limit—the government does not have an infinite capacity to
borrow. A government cannot run an unsustainable deficit indefinitely,
and the longer it runs an unsustainable deficit, the more costly the debt
becomes.
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE U.S.
With the background provided in Part I, we turn now to the specifics
of the U.S. debt and deficit. This Part begins by showing that the current
U.S. deficit is unsustainable. It then explains why the only policy solution
to an unsustainable deficit is to reduce the deficit. Lastly, it considers the
timing of the U.S. response to the deficit. In particular, it compares
immediate action to deferred action (deferred perhaps until there is a
crisis). Unsurprisingly, immediate action results in better outcomes.
A. An Unsustainable Deficit
As of March 2022, the total U.S. government debt held by the public
was $23.790 trillion, and the total debt including intragovernmental
holdings was $30.293 trillion.74 As of the fourth quarter of the

69. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-701, DEBT LIMIT: ANALYSIS OF 2011-2012
ACTIONS TAKEN AND EFFECT OF DELAYED INCREASE ON BORROWING COSTS (July 2012),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592832.pdf.
70. See id.
71. See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans Back Down, Ending Crisis Over
Shutdown and Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013
/10/17/us/congress-budget-debate.html.
72. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 69.
73. See id.
74. See Debt to the Penny, FISCALDATA,
https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/debt-to-the-penny/debt-to-the-penny (last updated Mar. 23,
2022).
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government’s 2021 fiscal year, the debt-to-GDP ratio was 1.23—and it is
expected to grow substantially.75 These numbers are large under both
historical and international comparisons.76 Nonetheless, there is evidence
to suggest that this level of debt may be sustainable.77 As economist
Olivier Blanchard notes, U.S. nominal GDP growth has recently been
around 4%, and the nominal interest rate on U.S. government debt has
been around 3%.78 Thus, if the GDP growth rate does not fall too much,
the government’s interest rate does not increase too much, and the
government runs small primary deficits, then the U.S. may be able to

75. See Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, FRED ECONOMIC
DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S. The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is expected to
increase the government debt by between $1 and $2 trillion within ten years of its enactment. This is a not
a partisan issue. The liberal-leaning Tax Policy Center and the conservative-leaning American Enterprise
Institute concur. See How did the TCJA affect the federal budget outlook?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tcja-affect-federal-budget-outlook#:~:text=
The%20Tax%20Cuts%20and%20Jobs%20Act%20cut%20taxes%20substantially%20from,debt%2C%2
0according%20to%20official%20estimates; Maya MacGuineas, The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act made the debt
worse and makes fixing it even harder, AEIDEAS BLOG (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.aei
.org/economics/the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-made-the-debt-worse-and-makes-fixing-it-even-harder/. And
the COVID-19 pandemic has increased U.S. government spending by $2.59 trillion through September 1,
2020. See DATALAB, supra note 29. The total cost of the government response to the pandemic is
expected to be much larger. Congress passed two relief bills in 2020 totaling $3.9 trillion, and President
Biden has proposed an additional $1.9 trillion dollar relief bill. See Tami Luhby & Katie Lobosco, Here’s
what’s in Biden’s $1.9 trillion economic rescue package, CNN (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.
com/2021/01/14/politics/biden-economic-rescue-package-coronavirus-stimulus/index.html.
76. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S.’s previous record was 1.06 during World War II.
See
Federal
Debt:
A
Primer, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 3
(Mar.
12,
2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56165. The three countries with the highest current debt-to-GDP ratios
are Sudan (2.73), Greece (2.26), and Japan (2.21). See Central Government Debt, Percent of GDP,
INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY
FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/CG_DEBT
_GDP@GDD/JPN (last accessed Mar. 22 2022). Greece required a bailout during the Euro debt crisis.
See Greece emerges from eurozone bailout programme, BBC (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45243088, and Sudan is currently in the process of negotiating a
debt bailout. See Andrea Shalal, IMF says working intensively with Sudan to move toward debt relief,
NASDAQ (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/imf-says-working-intensively-with-sudan-tomove-toward-debt-relief-2021-01-18. That being said, the US has some substantial structural and
institutional advantages over Sudan and Greece that limit the usefulness of these comparisons.
77. Moreover, the debt is too large to be paid off quickly. The U.S. would have to increase
government revenues by 82% to repay the debt in 10 years, 51% to repay the debt in 20 years, and 40%
to repay the debt in 30 years. Author’s computations which disregard the COVID-19 anomaly and assume
that GDP growth, government interest rate, and government expenditures as a share of GDP all remain
constant. Available upon request. To be clear, this means that, on average, every tax payment would have
to be increased by 82% in order to repay the debt within 10 years. If a taxpayer’s tax bill were $100 before
the tax increase, assuming all taxpayers bore the increase uniformly, that taxpayer’s tax bill would now
be $182. And this increase in tax revenue would be accompanied by no increase in government spending.
Statutory tax rates would likely have to increase much more as taxpayers responded to higher taxes with
more avoidance and evasion behavior. See Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis
of Individual Returns, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 363, 363 (1983). These would be crushing taxes that no
benevolent policymaker would consider imposing. See William G. Gale, Five Myths About Federal Debt,
BROOKINGS (May 2, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/five-myths-about-federal-debt/.
78. See Blanchard, supra note 55, at 1202.
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rollover its debt for the foreseeable future and possibly indefinitely.79
However, the U.S. is running large and persistent primary deficits.80 In
the past 50 years, the U.S. has run a primary deficit 37 times and in each
year since 2007.81 Moreover, the size of the deficits is increasing. As the
table below shows, the primary deficit as a percentage of GDP was three
times higher in the 2010s than it was in the 1980s—and the 2010s were a
decade with little if any cyclical deficit, avoiding the brunt of the Great
Recession and entirely escaping the COVID-19 pandemic.82

Decade

Deficit or Surplus Primary Deficit
(as % of GDP)

1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

Surplus
Surplus
Deficit
Deficit
Surplus
Deficit
Deficit

-.89%
-.45%
.59%
1.09%
-1.00%
.78%
3.31%

In 2020, the U.S. ran a $2.784 trillion primary deficit, which is
expected to fall slightly to $2.672 trillion in 2021 and then to $.848 trillion

79. Whether there is a welfare cost is a more complicated question that depends on numerous
factors and is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, across the political spectrum economists agree
now is the time to spend. See Heather Long, This recession is already deep. If Congress fails to act, a lot
of damage could be permanent., WASH. POST (July 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2020/07/30/economists-favor-big-stimulus/.
80. There is widespread agreement that the deficit is not sustainable. See, e.g., Auerbach, Gale, &
Krupkin, supra note 22. Even economists Jason Furman and Larry Summers, strong proponents of more
spending, write, in a paper in which they advocate for more substantially spending now, that “…current
projections do raise concerns over the fiscal situation beyond 2030…” See Furman & Summers, supra
note 30, at 3. Moreover, unsustainable deficits are associated with “macroeconomic instability arising
from undesirable consequences for a wide range of other macroeconomic variables.” See Joseph Mawejje
and Nicholas M. Odhiambo, The determinants of fiscal deficits: a survey of literature, 67 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS 403, 404 (2020).
81. See Historical Tables, WHITE HOUSE, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/historical-tables/. Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 3.1 were used in these computations.
82. Id. The primary deficit numbers in the table were computed by taking the sum of all real
primary deficits over the decade and dividing that by total real GDP over the decade. Negative numbers
indicate a surplus.
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in 2022 after the worst of pandemic has passed. 83 Stated relative to GDP,
the 2020 primary deficit was 13.3% of GDP but is expected to eventually
stabilize at 2.3% of GDP.84 All that is to say, the U.S. government is
running both large structural and cyclical primary deficits, which
combined are rapidly increasing the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio.
As noted in Part I, there are two related problems with a growing debtto-GDP ratio.85 First, as the ratio grows, the U.S. can borrow less in the
future. The less fiscal space the U.S. has, the higher the likelihood of a
financial crisis and severe political frictions.86 Second, a higher debt-toGDP ratio will lead to higher interest rates on the debt. Empirical evidence
bears this out.87 Controlling for the general decline in interest rates,
several econometric studies suggest that for each percentage point
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, the interest rate on U.S. government
debt will increase by approximately 3 basis points.88 A higher interest rate
will increase interest expense, exacting further demands on U.S. fiscal

83. See Additional Information About the Updated Budget and Economic Outlook: 2021 to 2031,
CONG. BUDGET OFF. 6 (July 2021), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57263. These numbers are likely an
underestimate because the CBO is constrained to forecast using current law, meaning it assumes
temporary tax cuts will expire and military spending will remain at current levels, among other similar
assumptions. Id. at 5. History has shown, however, that Congress generally enacts legislation to extend
tax cuts and increase military expenditures. See Auerbach & Gale, supra note 5, at 1555-56.
84. See Additional Information About the Updated Budget and Economic Outlook: 2021 to 2031,
CONG. BUDGET OFF. 6 (July 2021), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57263.
85. To get a rough sense for what the U.S.’s economic debt-to-GDP limit might be, recall from
Part I that to prevent government debt from becoming a Ponzi scheme, the condition 𝜃𝜏/𝑟 > 𝐷/𝑌 must
hold—the U.S. must be able to collect enough in taxes to at least pay interest on the debt. Assigning
numbers to these variables is an uncertain endeavor, but I will do so for illustrative purposes. The
government currently spends 10% of its receipts on interest; assume this number cannot exceed 30%.
Federal government receipts currently amount to 16% of GDP; assume this cannot exceed 50%. Recently
government average interest rates have been about 3%; assume the interest rate does not increase—despite
the available evidence suggesting that it will. Under these assumptions, the economic limit to the debt-toGDP ratio would be .3*.5/.03 = 3. Note this would make the U.S. the highest tax country with an advanced
economy in the world. The highest tax countries in the OECD currently are Belgium, Denmark, France,
and Sweden. Their tax revenue as a percentage of GDP hovers around 45%. See Revenue Statistics OECD Comparative Tables, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Aug.
15, 2020), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV#.
86. See supra Part I.A.
87. While it is true that the interest rate on government debt has trended down over time, the same
can be said for most interest rates in the U.S. Economists have shown that the difference between corporate
bond interest rates and government debt interest rates fall as the debt-to-GDP ratio increases. See
Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 67, at 234. In other words, relative to corporate bonds,
the interest on government debt is higher at higher debt-to-GDP ratio.
88. See, e.g., Thomas Laubach, New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and
Debt, 7 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 858, 858 (2009); See Engen & Hubbard, supra note 67, at 83; and Gabriel
Ehrlich and Aditi Thapar, Public Debt Levels and Real Interest Rates: Causal Evidence from
Parliamentary
Elections,
SSRN
(May
17,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3603563.
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space.89 And if the current course holds, at some point in the future, the
interest rate on U.S. government debt will exceed the U.S.’s GDP growth
rate. This will be an inflection point for U.S. government finances because
the debt will then surely have a fiscal cost.
This prospect raises two multi-trillion-dollar questions, which are
examined in the remainder of this Part. First, what policy options does the
U.S. have to make the deficit sustainable? And second, what are the
consequences of addressing the deficit later rather than sooner? This Part
shows that the answer to the first question is clear: In the long run, the
only way to make the deficit sustainable is to reduce it. The answer to the
second question is more nuanced. Generally, the sooner the government
acts, the less painful the deficit reduction will be. However, the rate at
which the deficit grows, coupled with global economic conditions and
U.S. economic conditions in particular, will have an enormous impact on
the size of the debt’s costs and the amount of time before the constraints
imposed by the debt bind. In other words, it is difficult to forecast the
costs of forestalling deficit reduction.
B. Policy Options to Resolve the Unsustainable Deficit
Barring some unlikely change, the U.S. government will eventually
have to act. Five policy solutions have been suggested to address the
government’s long-term fiscal imbalance: tax cuts, default, inflation,
spending cuts, and tax increases.90 The first three are nonviable. Tax cuts,
default, and inflation would aggravate, not resolve, the government’s
financial problems.91 And it would be difficult to substantially reduce the
deficit with a spending decrease, meaning that in all likelihood a majority
of the deficit reduction will have to come from a tax increase.
This Section begins by addressing the nonviable options. First, there
are some who make the specious claim that, under current conditions,

89. The CBO projects that U.S. interest expense will grow from $338 billion in 2020 to $664
billion in 2030 or from 1.6% of GDP to 2.2% of GDP. See An Update to Budget Outlook: 2020 to 2030,
CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Sept. 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56542.
90. A sixth alternative would be to increase government expenditures in the hopes that higher
government spending would drive up GDP growth rates to the point at which they exceed the government
interest rate. Because higher spending would increase the deficit, this would require an impossibly large
increase in GDP growth rates.
91. Demonstrating a remarkable ignorance of financial markets, President Trump suggested
reneging on outstanding U.S. government debt obligations to China. See John Foley, America could
actually shirk its debts to China, REUTERS (May 3, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unitedstates-china-debt-breakingview/breakingviews-america-could-actually-shirk-its-debts-to-china-idUSKB
N22G05Q. A few Republican senators followed suit. See Martha C. White, Should the U.S. refuse to pay
back its $1 trillion debt to China?, NBC NEWS (June 11, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business
/economy/should-u-s-refuse-pay-back-its-1-trillion-debt-n1227351.
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cutting taxes would lead to higher revenue.92 They claim that the U.S. tax
rate is above the revenue-maximizing tax rate.93 It is true that somewhere
between 0% and 100% is the revenue-maximizing tax rate.94 This
revenue-maximizing tax rate should not be the government’s objective,
but it should serve as an upper bound to good policy because, at rates
above this upper bound, the government can both increase revenue and
lessen the negative impact of taxes by lowering rates.95 However, the U.S.
is nowhere near the revenue-maximizing tax rate. The evidence for this is
abundant. Simply put, revenues have increased when rates have
increased, and revenues have decreased when rates have decreased.96
Second, there are some that make the preposterous claim that
defaulting on the debt would be advantageous.97 Those who make this
claim are wrong for many reasons including that they do not account for
the unsustainable deficit. The U.S. government is forecasted to be an
enormous debtor for the foreseeable future. Default would eliminate past
debts but would not resolve the budgetary imbalance that necessitates
future borrowing. Without a doubt, default would exacerbate the problem
by locking the U.S. out of credit markets and increasing the U.S. cost of
borrowing.98 If locked out of credit markets, the U.S. would have to

92. See Mike Patton, Do Tax Cuts Increase Government Revenue?, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2012/10/15/do-tax-cuts-increase-governmentrevenue/?sh=5cef15954bf2. This incredibly flawed analysis looks at correlations between the top
marginal tax rate and nominal government revenue. Serious scholars have found that the revenuemaximizing marginal tax rate is 55% or higher. See Sarah K. Burns and James P. Ziliak, Identifying the
Elasticity of Taxable Income, 127 ECON. J. 297 (Mar. 2017).
93. Technically, they claim that U.S. tax rates are above the revenue-maximizing tax rates because
there is more than one tax rate.
94. If a tax rate of 100% were applied to an economic activity, one would expect little if any of
that economic activity to be reported for tax purposes. It follows that at a 100% tax rate, the government
will collect little if any revenue. Similarly, at a tax rate of 0%, there is obviously no tax revenue. As the
tax rate increases from 0%, and decreases from 100%, government revenue gets larger.
95. This concept is sometimes referred to as the Laffer curve—a poor name given that Arthur
Laffer popularized but did not invent it. The original intuition is attributed to Ibn Khaldun, an Arab social
theorist, writing in the 14th century. Virtually no economists across the political spectrum believe that the
U.S. is on the wrong side of the curve. See Elizabeth Popp Berman, Trump is Giving Arthur Laffer the
Presidential Medal of Freedom. Economists aren’t smiling., WASH. POST (June 1, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/01/trump-is-giving-arthur-laffer-presidential-medalfreedom-economists-arent-laughing/.
96. One need look no further than the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act for ample proof. See William
G. Gale et al., Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Preliminary Analysis, TAX POL’Y CTR 8 (June 13,
2018); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 49, at 223-24.
97. See Martha C. White, Should the U.S. refuse to pay back its $1 trillion debt to China?, NBC
NEWS (Jun. 11 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/should-u-s-refuse-pay-back-its-1trillion-debt-n1227351; John Foley, Breakingviews - America could actually shirk its debts to China,
REUTERS (May 3, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-united-states-china-debt-breakingview
/breakingviews-america-could-actually-shirk-its-debts-to-china-idUSKBN22G05Q.
98. It takes sovereign defaulters, on average, 5.7 years to regain partial credit market access and
8.4 years to regain full access. See EDUARDO BORENSZTEIN AND UGO PANIZZA, THE COSTS OF
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eliminate its deficit, which would require abrupt and large tax increases
or spending cuts.
Third, some argue that inflation could resolve the government’s fiscal
imbalance.99 Those in the inflation-will-save-the-day camp make the
same conceptual error as those who believe that default would be
beneficial. Inflation generally helps debtors (with fixed interest rates) by
decreasing the real value of what they must repay to their creditors.100 But
the U.S. government does not plan to pay off its loans—it intends to roll
them over and borrow substantially more to boot. Inflation will simply
increase the nominal cost of future borrowing, making any reprieve
temporary. An empirical study that carefully looks at the maturity
structure of U.S. government debt obligations shows that there is little
benefit to inflating current debt away.101
If higher inflation created uncertainty over the level of future inflation,
investors might insist on contractual inflation protections and demand
higher interest rates for the increased risk, thereby aggravating the
government’s fiscal imbalance.102 This effect would be exacerbated if
investors attributed the increased inflation to poor governance, and the
effect would likely be severe if investors believed the government were
intentionally creating inflation to manage the debt.103 If inflation grew too
high, the U.S. could be shut out of credit markets entirely.104 This, again,
would result in abrupt and large tax increases or spending cuts. Moreover,
inflation is an unpredictable behavioral phenomenon that is not entirely
understood and, even at moderate levels, can be costly and regressive.105
SOVEREIGN DEFAULT 699. Recent sovereign defaults have been associated with a 20-basis point increase
in the interest rate Id. at 702.
99. See Noah Smith, Inflation Is the Way to Pay Off Coronavirus Debt, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May
7, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-05-07/inflation-is-the-way-to-pay-off-cor
onavirus-debt.
100. See G. L. Bach & Albert Ando, The Redistributional Effects of Inflation, 39 REV. ECONS. &
STATISTICS 1 (1957). This effect will not apply when inflation protections are written into the debt
instruments. 9% of U.S. government debt is Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, which inflation will
not reduce in real value. See Federal Debt: A Primer, CONG. BUDGET OFF. 3 (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56309#:~:text=Treasury%20Inflation%2DProtected%20Securities&te
xt=The%20value%20of%20outstanding%20TIPS,percent%20of%20all%20marketable%20debt.
101. See Jens Hilscher et al., Inflating away the public debt? An empirical assessment (October
2020), https://personal.lse.ac.uk/reisr/papers/99-HilscherRavivReisdebt.pdf.
102. High or variable inflation discourages investment. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 550.
103. Id.
104. Hyperinflation is generally followed by an economic crisis. See Scott A. Wolla & Kaitlyn
Frerking, Making Sense of the National Debt, RSCH. FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS: PAGE ONE ECONS.
(Nov. 2019), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2019/11/01/making-sense-of-thenational-debt.
105. Inflation causes people to engage in unproductive activities to avoid holding real money
balances and causes people and businesses to incur costs because of more frequent price changes. See
ROMER, supra note 26, at 548. More substantial costs arise because inflation introduces distortions into
the tax system—for example, nominal, not real, capital gains are subject to tax, meaning effectively a
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Inflation has proven time and again that it does not submit to the will of
government institutions. History offers numerous examples of
governments trying and failing to lower or raise inflation or succeeding
but at a substantial cost.106
The U.S. has an unsustainable deficit problem. Its outlays are projected
to exceed its revenues by a substantial margin for the foreseeable future,
meaning that the U.S. government will have to borrow substantial
amounts for the foreseeable future. Lower taxes, default, and inflation will
not resolve the deficit—instead they will exacerbate the strain on
government finances.107 So as tax policy experts have long known, there
are only two viable solutions to the deficit problem: raise taxes or lower
expenditures (or some combination of the two).
The vast majority of tax academics believe that tax increases should be
used in a deficit reduction effort.108 Moreover, there is no obvious
legislative coalition that would vote in favor of the drastic cuts necessary
to make the deficit sustainable. Any substantial decrease in the deficit
would require cuts to the three largest budget items—Social Security
programs, major healthcare programs (mostly Medicare and Medicaid),
and defense—which together comprised $2.97 trillion (or 78%) of the

higher capital gains tax. Id. If people are not perfectly rational there are additional costs to inflation,
including that people may misprice items or have difficulty making optimal spending decisions. Id. at
549. People also strongly dislike inflation. Id. Lastly, there is a negative association between inflation and
investment. Id. at 550. There is also substantial evidence that inflation is regressive. See Andrés Erosa &
Gustavo Ventura, On inflation as a regressive consumption tax, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 761, 762. (2002);
Stefania Albanesi, Inflation and inequality, 54 J. MONETARY ECON. 1088 (2007); and William Easterly
& Stanley Fischer, Inflation and the Poor. 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 160 (2001).
106. All other things constant, an increase in the money supply will cause inflation. Of this there is
no doubt. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 497-98. Over the past two decades, U.S. monetary policy has
increased the money supply without a concomitant increase in inflation. The correct inference to draw
from this fact is not that an increase in money supply has no effect on inflation. Rather, the correct
inference is that inflation is a complicated behavioral economic phenomenon that economists do not
completely understand. And, indeed, one need only think of the 1970s and 80s when the U.S. had high
inflation and the only solution then was to intentionally enter the U.S. into a recession, a course of action
that should undoubtedly be avoided if possible. Carl Walsh, October 6, 1979, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER
2004-35 (Dec. 2004).
107. Default often leads to a tax increase. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 606. Greece, for example,
as a condition of the emergency funds it received in 2010, was required to raise taxes, lower expenditures,
and make several other policy changes. See Explaining Greece’s Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/international/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html.
And
ultimately, the most successful countermeasure to high inflation is the elimination of the budget deficit,
which almost certainly requires large tax increases. See Kiguel, supra note 42, at 154. See also ROMER,
supra note 26, at 538-39.
108. 77% of National Tax Association members who participated in a survey responded “yes” to
the question, “Should federal revenues as a share of the U.S. economy come up above past historical
averages (of 18–19 percent) as part of any deficit reduction effort?” Diane Lim et al., Expert and Public
Attitudes Towards Tax Policy: 2013, 1994, and 1934, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 775, 783 (2013). In the political
arena, there are some who call for decreased expenditures, but few are explicit about what should be cut
and even fewer in positions of power consistently vote to cut expenditures.
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U.S. government’s budget in 2019.109 To make the 2019 budget
sustainable, for example, would require a deficit reduction of several
hundred billion dollars.110 The three largest non-defense discretionary
items in 2019 were education, training, employment, and social services
($95 billion); transportation ($94 billion); and veterans’ benefits and
services ($85 billion).111 These are tiny fractions of the budget, which
even if entirely cut and summed together would not sufficiently reduce
the deficit. Given the political difficulties inherent in cutting defense,
Social Security, and Medicare spending, substantial tax increases will
almost surely be part of any viable solution.112
C. The Timing of Deficit Reduction
The deficit must be reduced at some point in the future. Now, in the
midst of a pandemic, is not the time to reduce the deficit.113 Nonetheless,
the longer the U.S. government waits, the more painful the deficit
reduction will be.114 Deferring action will result in less fiscal space, higher
interest rates, more political friction, a higher probability of a crisis, and
a larger required deficit reduction. That being said, any predictions about
the future of government finances must begin with the concession that
there is enormous uncertainty, making it impossible to precisely forecast
the cost of deferring action.115 To forecast GDP and the government’s
109. In 2019, spending on Social Security programs totaled $1.04 trillion, spending on major
healthcare programs (mostly Medicare and Medicaid) totaled $1.26 trillion, and defense spending totaled
$676 billion. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, CONG. BUDGET OFF., 7, 18, 22 (Jan.
2020).
110. How large the spending cut would have to be to make the deficit sustainable is debatable. In
2019, the total deficit was $984 billion, and the primary deficit was $608 billion. Id. at 7, 24. In any given
year, the U.S. government can run a total deficit equal to the deficit times the GDP growth rate without
reducing fiscal space. In 2019, a deficit of $672 billion (4% times $16,803 billion) would not have reduced
fiscal space. Looking at 2019 alone, the U.S. would only require a deficit reduction of $312 billion.
However, every decade or so the government runs an enormous cyclical deficit to counteract an exigency
(e.g., the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic). Taking the cyclical deficit into account, the U.S.
likely needs eliminate its structural primary deficit. In other words, the U.S. deficit exceeded what is
sustainable in 2019 by roughly $608 billion. And at higher interest rates, the required cuts would be even
larger.
111. The Federal Budget in 2019, A Closer Look at Discretionary Spending, CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE 2 (Apr. 2020).
112. To eliminate the primary deficit in 2019, the government would have needed to cut Social
Security and major healthcare programs by Medicare by at least 26%. In future years, the required cuts
would be much larger because of the unfavorable demographics of the U.S.
113. See Long, supra note 79.
114. See Auerbach, Gale, & Krupkin, supra note 22, at 2.
115. Experts do not even agree on what indicators best foretell a pending crisis for U.S. government
finances. Those who argue that shrinking the deficit should be an immediate priority tend to focus on the
fact that the debt-to-GDP ratio is nearing its all-time high and that the deficit is growing at an increasingly
fast rate. See, e.g., Auerbach, Gale & Krupkin, supra note 22, at 2-3. They argue that the fundamental
problem is that the United States has no plan to shrink its deficit, which itself will only grow worse as the
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budget requires estimates for several economic, demographic,
geopolitical, and meteorological parameters, about which anyone can,
frankly, only make an educated guess. If the deficit grows (but grows
slowly), and global economic conditions (and U.S. economic conditions
in particular) are good, then the cost of inaction may be low, and the U.S.
may not have to shrink its deficit for decades.116 If the deficit continues to
grow at an increasingly fast pace, or the U.S. does not recover quickly
from the COVID-19 pandemic, then the cost of inaction will be high, and
the deficit will have to be dealt with sooner.
To begin with the good news, the U.S. has an enormous capacity to
borrow.117 Despite debt reaching record highs, interest rates and inflation
remain low.118 This is, at least in part, because U.S. government debt is
U.S. population ages and Social Security and Medicaid expenditures increase. See id. at 9. Those who
argue that shrinking the deficit need not be an immediate priority point to the incredibly low interest rates
at which the U.S. government can borrow. See, e.g., Blanchard, supra note 55, at 1197; Jason Furman &
Lawrence Summers, Who’s Afraid of Budget Deficits: How Washington Should End Its Debt Obsession,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar.-Apr. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-01-27/whos-afraidbudget-deficits. These low interest rates also imply a low interest cost of debt and suggest that the
collective wisdom of the financial markets considers U.S. government debt a very low risk investment
despite its recent history and forecasted trajectory of rapid debt growth. A third view posits that the most
important indicator of whether the government is nearing fiscal crisis is the rate of inflation of U.S. dollar.
See, e.g., Inflation, THE GOWER INITIATIVE FOR MODERN MONETARY STUDIES,
https://gimms.org.uk/fact-sheets/inflation/. Under this view, because the U.S. government can print
dollars at will, deficits are of little concern until expansion in the money supply causes inflation. See id.
Only when the rate of inflation increases will the U.S. be forced to confront the deficit. However, as noted
above, fighting inflation can be difficult, painful, and costly.
116. Positive changes that would help include new technological developments that increase the
rate of GDP growth or an influx of highly productive immigrants that consume relatively few government
services. Negative changes that would help include a sudden substantial decrease in life expectancy
without an increase in healthcare costs or working years. And, of course, if a meteor destroys the earth,
the entire discussion becomes moot.
117. There is still strong demand for U.S. government debt at very low interest rates, which suggests
that the collective wisdom of the financial markets finds the U.S. government has a low default risk. Fitch
Ratings, a credit rating agency, gives U.S. government debt a AAA rating, the highest on its scale.
However, Fitch has a negative outlook on U.S. debt because of the high debt and deficit. See Fitch Revises
United States’ Outlook to Negative; Affirms at ‘AAA’, FITCH RATINGS (July 31, 2020),
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/fitch-revises-united-states-outlook-to-negativeaffirms-at-aaa-31-07-2020.
118. Interest rates are low by historical standards. See Federal Net Interests Costs: A Primer, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. (Dec. 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56910#:~:text=As%20a%20result%2C%
20despite%20the,see%20Figure%201%2D1). Since the onset of the Great Recession U.S. government
borrowing has exploded. Normally this would drive interest rates up, but demand for U.S. government
debt also grew for a few reasons. First, investors, and especially foreign investors, showed an increased
preference for the relative safety and liquidity of U.S. government debt. Second, changes in banking
regulations required banks to hold safer assets, including treasuries. See David Andolfatto & Andrew
Spewak, On the Supply of, and Demand for, U.S. Treasury Debt, 5 ECON. SYNOPSES 1, 1-3 (2018),
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2018/03/09/on-the-supply-of-anddemand-for-u-s-treasury-debt/. The other concern is inflation because U.S. debt is very liquid it may act
like a type of money. See Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 67, at 234. This is even more
of a concern because the Federal Reserve has purchased treasuries on the open market, actually increasing
the money supply. See Assets: Securities Held Outright: U.S. Treasury Securities: All: Wednesday Level,
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viewed as a safe and liquid investment, even when compared to the
government debt of similar countries.119 And government interest rates
show no clear signs of a looming rapid increase.120
Other indicators are less favorable. GDP growth has slowed in the past
several decades.121 Between 1960 and 2000, real per capita GDP grew
over 2.39% per year, but it grew only 1.12% per year between 2000 and
2019.122 Lower GDP growth means the growth in the U.S. government’s
capacity to raise revenue is also falling. Moreover, lower GDP growth
makes it less likely that the U.S. can rollover its debt without a fiscal cost.
Demographic projections are also worrying. The U.S. is a “graying
nation.”123 Increases in life expectancy and decreases in fertility have
swelled the portion of the population above age 65.124 This shift to an
older population will substantially increase the demands on Social
Security and Medicare, which will further grow the deficit.125
However, the largest cause for concern is the growing fraction of
government spending paid for with borrowing and the increasingly fast
growth rate of the deficit. Even in 2019, before the pandemic, the U.S.
government borrowed over 22.1% of its budget.126 And since 1950, the
FRED ECONOMIC DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST. Nonetheless inflation remains low.
See Inflation, consumer prices for the United States, FRED ECONOMIC DATA,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FPCPITOTLZGUSA.
119. Treasuries have two advantages over bank deposits. First, treasuries typically pay a higher
interest rate. Second, bank deposits are only insured up to $250,000, whereas any size treasury holdings
are backed by the U.S. government. Moreover, treasuries can be used as collateral to borrow cash at low
rates in a repo transaction. See David Andolfatto, Does the National Debt Matter?, ST. LOUIS FED. (Jan.
11, 2021), https://medium.com/st-louis-fed/does-the-national-debt-matter-f99bedc0e14a. Because of
their relative safety and liquidity, the U.S. government can pay less interest than other similar countries.
See Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 67, at 234. However, recently the “treasury
premium” has decreased as the availability of treasuries has increased drastically. See Wenxin Dua et al.,
The U.S. Treasury Premium, 112 J. INT’L ECONS. 167 (2018). Moreover, if at any point investors stop
believing that treasuries are liquid and safe, there will be a glut in the market for U.S. government debt,
which will cause interest rates to increase.
120. If interest rates were expected to rise, treasury futures would fall in value. This has yet to
happen.
See
10
Year
Treasury
Futures
–
Price
&
Chart, MACROTRENDS,
https://www.macrotrends.net/futures/10-year-treasury.
121. On average, real GDP growth has decreased by 3 basis points per year between 1948 and 2019.
See Real Gross Domestic Product, FRED ECONOMIC DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1#0.
122. See Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, FRED ECONOMIC DATA,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A939RX0Q048SBEA#0. The growth rate is even lower if measured
between 2000 and 2020 because of the pandemic.
123. See Jonathan Vespa, Lauren Medina, and David M. Armstrong, Demographic Turning Points
for the United States: Population Projections for 2020 to 2060, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 (Mar. 2018),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf.
124. There are currently 3 old-age dependents for every 10 working age people. This is already high
by historical standards, and this ratio is expected to increase to 4 old-age dependents for every 10 working
age people within the next few decades. Id. at 5.
125. See Auerbach, Gale, & Krupkin, supra note 22.
126. See The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Jan. 2020),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56020.
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deficit as a percentage of GDP has increased, on average, by five basis
points per year; since 2000, it has increased, on average, twenty-four basis
points per year.127 As noted above, the primary deficit as a percentage of
GDP was three times higher in the 2010s than it was in the 1980s.128
Right now, a gradual approach to deficit reduction is possible. Slow
increases to government revenues could be used to shrink the deficit until
it is sustainable. If the government does nothing, gradual increases will
eventually be insufficient to address the deficit, and the government will
be forced to reduce the deficit abruptly. To highlight the difference
between a sudden and a gradual deficit reduction, the graph below plots
aggregate after-tax income (GDP less taxes) over time from two
simulations.129 The relevant simulation parameters, which approximate
post-pandemic conditions in the U.S., are recorded in the table below.130

Simulation Parameters

Initial debt-to-GDP ratio
GDP growth rate
Initial interest rate
Non-interest government outlays (% of GDP)
Initial primary deficit (% of GDP)
Initial tax revenue (% of GDP)
Max debt-to-GDP ratio

1.3
4%
3%
19.75%
3.3%
16.15%
5

In the gradual simulation, the government slowly increases tax
collections starting in 2021 to chip away at the unsustainable primary
deficit. In the sudden simulation, the government stays the course until
the debt-to-GDP ratio hits five, at which point the government raises taxes

127. See Historical Tables, supra note 81.
128. This is far above what is sustainable. See Paolo Canofaria et al., Financial Crisis and
Sustainability of US Fiscal Deficit: Indicators or Tests?, 42 J. POL’Y MODELING 192 (2020). To be clear:
the deficit as a share of GDP is unsustainable. The dollar value of the deficit might be sustainable,
depending on economic variables, including the GDP growth rate and the government debt interest rate.
129. For analytical simplicity the entire deficit reduction comes from tax increases. This avoids
modeling how to assign the benefit of government services to different cohorts of taxpayers.
130. These numbers approximate the current and predicted condition in the U.S. The U.S.’s current
debt-to-GDP ratio is roughly 1.3; the U.S. nominal GDP growth has been approximately 4% recently; the
nominal interest rate on government debt has been approximately 3% recently; the primary deficit in the
2010s was approximately 3.3% of GDP; the government spends about 19.75% of GDP on non-interest
expenditures; and the government collects about 16.15% of GDP in revenue.
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to avoid default and hyperinflation.131

GDP less Taxes
in trillions of dollars
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Sudden

In the sudden simulation, the government runs unsustainable deficits
until 2061. In that year, it must substantially increase its tax revenue to
avoid economic collapse. In the gradual simulation, the burden of the tax
increase is diffuse; in the sudden simulation, the burden of the tax increase
is relatively concentrated. Of course, a hybrid gradual/sudden scenario is
possible, in which case taxes increase some before the maximum debt-toGDP ratio is reached but not enough to prevent a substantial increase
when the limit is hit.
The sudden simulation understates the costs of the tax increase because
(1) there are no behavioral responses to the tax increase, (2) there are no
costs to hitting the maximum debt-to-GDP ratio, and (3) the government
does not pay off any debt to create fiscal space—it merely continues to
borrow as much as it can while not exceeding the economic limit. Thus,
in all likelihood, the tax increase would need to be larger than in the
simulation, and GDP growth would fall because of the debt crisis.132
Moreover, the simulation assumes no future cyclical deficit. A cyclical
deficit would decrease the amount of time before the debt reached its
economic limit and increase the harm from a sudden tax increase, which
would likely coincide with a crisis.
As a final point, the necessity of a sudden deficit reduction is perhaps
surprisingly likely for two reasons. First, political pressures tend to pull
131. The economic debt limit of 5 is arbitrary, but it does not matter what number is chosen. A
larger number simply means a later debt market collapse, and smaller number simply means an earlier
debt market collapse.
132. The sudden simulation overestimates the harm of the tax increase because some of the deficit
reduction would likely come from a reduction in spending, including entitlement reform, which might fall
on either earlier or later taxpayers.
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government spending up and push taxes down, and nothing on the horizon
suggests that those tendencies are likely to change.133 There is no plan to
manage the deficit, and the political will to even embark on a discussion
of what such a plan might entail is noticeably lacking. Second, market
crashes tend to happen suddenly and with relatively little warning. If
investors start to doubt the U.S. government’s ability to repay without
printing money, they will demand a higher interest rate, which will
increase the government’s expenses, which will further increase
investors’ doubts about the government’s ability to repay.134 This cycle
repeats itself rapidly until the market for government debt collapses.135
III. INTERGENERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
Part II showed that the deficit must eventually be reduced. How the
deficit is reduced will have an effect on relative intergenerational
outcomes. This Part first discusses the challenges of intergenerational
equity and suggests specific criteria to determine whether a government
policy has resulted in a violation of intergenerational equity. It then
discusses the various challenges in determining the effects of government
policy on the intergenerational distribution of economic outcomes. Lastly,
this Part offers an example of how an unsustainable deficit could cause a
violation of intergenerational equity by resulting in a large and sudden tax
increase. This sets the stage for the discussion of the wealth tax remedy
in Part IV.
A. Defining Intergenerational Equity
Defining equity in the intergenerational context is not a simple task.
There are numerous issues that arise from measuring wellbeing across
generations.136 To name a few, how should the benefit of government
spending be assigned to individuals across generations? 137 How can the
133. Federal government outlays as a percentage of GDP have increased, on average, 3.6 basis
points per year since 1988. See Federal Net Outlays as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, FRED
ECONOMIC DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYONGDA188S. Federal government revenues as a
percentage of GDP have decreased, on average, 5.3 basis points per year since 1988. See Federal Receipts
as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, FRED ECONOMIC DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org
/series/FYFRGDA188S#0.
134. There is an economic limit to the debt, but it is unknown. Indeed, the economic limit is hit
when sufficiently many investors flee the debt market causing it to collapse. If the limit were known, the
government could plan to avoid it. Because it is unknown and the government has poorly-aligned
incentives and a tendency towards fiscal optimism, the possibility of a crisis is real.
135. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 607-12.
136. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations, supra note 5, at 1262-65.
137. Thompson, supra note 3, at 6, 9. Moreover, there is no reason to focus on the cost and benefits
of government action alone. Private actions too have intergenerational consequences that might well
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wellbeing of people across generations be compared?138 How should the
general tendency for each generation to be, on average, wealthier than its
predecessors be accounted for?139 Moreover, although there is a nearly
universal consensus that intergenerational equity is important,140 there is
no consensus at all on what is owed to future generations.141 Suggested
answers range from nothing to everything.142 And beyond the usual
challenges raised in the intragenerational context, intergenerational equity
engenders a host of metaphysical questions.143 It is unsurprising that a
wide range of incompatible frameworks have been put forth to evaluate
intergenerational equity.144
change optimal government policy. Michael Doran, Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 61
TAX L. REV. 241 (2008).
138. Buchanan, U.S. Fiscal Policy Does Not Cheat Future Generations, supra note 61, at 51-52;
Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations, supra note 5. The standard economics approach applies
a discount factor, but even in this tractable framework it’s not obvious what the discount factor should be.
Id. at 1247. This is made even more challenging because those alive today do not know what the
preferences of future generations will be. Id. at 1245-46 (for example, offering automobile infrastructure
that might benefit future generations but only under the assumption that they will have sufficiently high
preferences for automobiles).
139. Thompson, supra note 3, at 6. Indeed, it may even be possible to be too generous to future
generations. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future Generations, supra note 5, at 1273.
140. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284 (1971); Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future
Generations, supra note 5, at 1251. There are some philosophical challenges to this consensus. See
Terence Ball, The Incoherence of Intergenerational Justice, 28 INQUIRY 321-324 (1985) (arguing the
concept of intergenerational justice is incoherent because people cannot owe an obligation to an abstract
entity). Ball, nonetheless, concludes that there is an obligation to be just. Id. at 333. Another challenge
stems from the possibility that today’s actions not only change the conditions of the future but might also
change which people will inhabit that future. If it is preferable to exist, then any action that changes which
people comprise future generations must benefit those future generations, meaning that intergenerational
equity may be a paradox. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 365-64 (1984). See generally
SHAVIRO, supra note 48, at 171-72.
141. See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term Deficits, 58 TAX
L. REV. 275, 322-25 (2005); see generally Thompson, supra note 3.
142. Jan Narveson, Future People and Us, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 38, 38
(Richard I. Sikora & Brian M. Barry eds. 1978) (“What, if anything, do we owe future generations?
Answers to this question vary widely. Indeed, they range all the way from Nothing to Everything…”).
Thomas Jefferson thought that no generation should bind its predecessors and argued that thus debts
should last no longer than 19 years. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (September 6 1789)
in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON VOL. 15 27 MARCH 1789 TO 30 NOVEMBER 1789, 392-98
(Princeton Univ. Press, 1958), available at https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selecteddocuments/thomas-jefferson-james-madison. Edmund Burke viewed intergenerational equity as a
partnership between generations that placed moral prohibitions on what generations might do. EDMUND
BURKE, SELECT WORKS, VOL. II- REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 114 (E. J. Payne ed.,
Clarendon Press 1898) (1790). And, while conceding that intergeneration equity placed severe, if not
impossible, strains on every ethical theory, John Rawls argued that there is an obligation to set aside
capital and maintain institutions for future generations. RAWLS, supra note 140, at 284-85. Rawls also
argued that, under the veil of ignorance, all generations should be equally obligated to their predecessors,
specifically by committing to a savings rate. Id. at 287.
143. See SHAVIRO, supra note 48, at 168-173.
144. For example, both Thomas Jefferson and Edmund Burke suggested intergenerational equity
norms. See id. at 164-65. Two common types are “no transfer” norms and “generational balance” norms.
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In this Article, I will apply a two-criteria definition to determine
whether a government policy results in an intergenerational equity
violation. Criterion one: the policy improves outcomes for generation A
and worsens outcomes for generation B. Criterion two: after taking into
consideration the effect of the policy, generation B is worse off than
generation A. If both criteria are met, the policy violates intergenerational
equity. Under this definition, government policies that result in
intergenerational transfers do not violate intergenerational equity so long
as they are transfers from those that are better off to those that are worse
off.145
For concreteness, consider the following example. Assume that
generation A was born before generation B. The government borrows
funds and transfers the cash to generation A. Then the government raises
taxes from generation B to repay the debt. If generation B is worse off
than generation A, this policy would violate intergenerational equity. But
if, including the transfer, generation B is better off than generation A, this
policy would not violate intergenerational equity.
B. The Relative Wellbeing of Different Generations
As shown in Part I, if the government runs an unsustainable deficit for
long enough, future taxpayers will bear a fiscal cost. An unsustainable
deficit will push up the interest rate on government debt until it exceeds
the GDP growth rate. At that point there will be a fiscal cost to the debt
because it can no longer be rolled over indefinitely. As long as the
government has access to credit markets, the fiscal cost can be deferred.
But the more the government borrows, the larger the fiscal cost will

The no transfer norms may be justified by an appeal to the benefit principle and state that no generation
should impose burdens on another. What this means in practice is not always obvious. Id. at 152-57. The
“generational balance” norms state that all generations should be treated equally in some sense. Id. at 157164.
145. Looking only at generations and not the individuals in those generations may result in a
perverse outcome. For example, consider a policy that transferred from the poorest members of a young
generation to the wealthiest members of an old generation. If on average the older generation were poorer,
this might not be an intergenerational equity violation under our definition. And the possibility of such a
transfer is not merely an academic possibility. There is at least some evidence that the intergenerational
consequences of deficit spending will not be equity enhancing. For example, some, if not most, of the tax
cuts of the past several decades have disproportionally benefitted the wealthy. See Auerbach, Gale, &
Krupkin, supra note 22, at 14-15. And many of the programs that are likely to be cut because of the force
the debt exerts on the government budget are those that disproportionally benefit the poor. The budgets
put forth by President Trump include deep cuts to several programs designed to help low-income
households. See Richard Kogan et al., Cuts to Low-Income Assistance Programs in President Trump’s
2020 Budget Are Wide-Ranging, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (May 15, 2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/cuts-to-low-income-assistance-programs-in-presidenttrumps-2020-budget-are.
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eventually be.146 Sometime before the debt-to-GDP ratio hits its economic
limit, some group of taxpayers will start bearing the fiscal cost.147
But just because a future group of taxpayers bears the cost of an
unsustainable deficit, it does not necessarily follow that there has been an
intergenerational equity violation for three reasons. First, the above does
not account for the benefits of government spending. In particular, if the
deficit-spending were on public goods and services that would
disproportionally benefit younger and future taxpayers, then both the
benefit and burden of the deficit might accrue to those younger and future
taxpayers. Second, the above does not account for any behavioral
responses. Both lower taxes and higher government debt might change
the decisions of taxpayers in ways that could potentially reduce (or
increase) the benefit accruing to earlier taxpayers and the burdens falling
on later taxpayers. Third, historically, most generations have been better
off than their predecessors, meaning that some transfer of wealth from
younger to older generations might be consistent with intergenerational
equity. I consider each of these below.
1. Accounting for Government Outlays
The benefit of government spending may not accrue concurrently with
the expenditure.148 Consider, for example, a water filtration system that
cleans large bodies of water and has a very large upfront cost. Assume
this system takes sixty years to clean a body of water, and therefore the
current cohort of taxpayers is not likely to get much benefit from it. If the
cost of the water filtration system is financed with current taxes, there is
an intergenerational transfer from the current cohort to future cohorts. The
current generation pays, and a future generation benefits.149 If, however,
the cost of the filtration system is financed with borrowing, and the costs
of that debt are borne starting in sixty years, there is no intergenerational

146. Default, in some sense, avoids the fiscal cost but only by imposing its own likely larger costs.
147. An alternative way to view this intergenerational consequence follows from the fact that at
higher debt-to-GDP ratios, the government has a reduced capacity to borrow. Earlier generations can
finance a substantial portion of government expenditures with borrowing. If these earlier generations run
unsustainable deficits, eventually the government must reduce its deficit. Later generations must make up
the deficit with higher taxes and lower spending. Future borrowing is an opportunity of cost unsustainable
deficits today.
148. See Auerbach, Gale, & Krupkin, supra note 22. A complete analysis would examine the
distribution of benefits and costs of expenditures, taxes, and the behavioral responses to both in a general
equilibrium setting.
149. More generally, spending can benefit past, current, or future taxpaying cohorts, and an
intergenerational transfer occurs if the tax burden falls on a cohort different from the one to which the
benefit accrues.
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transfer, neither to nor from the current generation.150
There is, however, no evidence that current government expenditures
have benefits which accrue disproportionally to future taxpayers.
Government spending as a fraction of GDP has remained nearly
constant,151 and the fraction of expenditure that would predominantly
benefit future cohorts (e.g., education and climate change) has been
minuscule.152 If anything, the budget has trended towards favoring older
and past taxpaying cohorts as Social Security and Medicare expenditures
have grown, which only exacerbates the intergenerational consequences
of the unsustainable deficit.153
2. Behavioral Responses
There are several behavioral responses to taxes and government
borrowing that might mitigate or augment the intergenerational
consequences of an unsustainable deficit. The first possible behavioral
response is that earlier generations may opt to leave larger bequests to
their descendants if the government borrows more. In other words, earlier
generations can undo the intergenerational consequences of deficit
spending with actions in the private market. The strongest form of this
claim is called Ricardian equivalence. Ricardian equivalence states that
the government financing decision is irrelevant because rational actors
150. There may still be transfers between generations starting in sixty years depending on how the
debt repayment is allocated. This analysis becomes much more difficult if the benefit of and willingness
to pay for non-cash government expenditures spans several generations, which is a particularly vexing
problem because there is no way to discover the subjective value that all affected individuals in all affected
generations would place on any particular spending program. Consider, as an extreme example, military
expenditures made to repel an invading army. If the invasion would result in the complete destruction of
the country, then both current and future cohorts would presumably be willing to foot the bill for those
expenditures. Though not as stark as the existential crisis of an invasion, a similar logic may apply to
healthcare, education, and many other government programs. The beneficiaries of the spending may span
several cohorts as may the willingness to pay for those programs. Children, for example, benefit from
having parents with higher educational attainment. See Matt Dickson et al., Early, Late or Never? When
Does Parental Education Impact Child Outcomes? 126 ECON. J. 184, 184 (2016).
151. Since 1970, excluding the Great Recession, total U.S. government expenditures ranged from
33.38% of GDP to 39.37% of GDP. This includes state and local expenditures. Spending rose to 43.26%
during the Great Recession. See Data, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, https://data.oecd.org/.
152. In 2017, the U.S. spent $13.2 billion (less than 0.5% of government expenditures) on programs
that touch on climate change, but only 6% of that spending was dedicated to climate change. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-223, CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS OF REPORTED FEDERAL
FUNDING 18 (Apr. 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691572.pdf. In 2019, the U.S. spent $95 billion
(2.14% of government expenditures) on education, training, employment, and social services. See CONG.
BUDGET OFF., supra note 111, at 2.
153. U.S. expenditures on healthcare, which mostly benefit the elderly, increased from 2.80% of
GDP in 1970 to 9.31% of GDP in 2018; U.S. expenditures on social protection, which also mostly benefit
the elderly, increased from 5.48% of GDP in 1970 to 7.54% of GDP in 2018. See ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 151.
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will change their behavior to exactly offset the government’s decision.154
In other words, it does not matter if the government finances its
expenditure with bonds or taxes.155 The overwhelming evidence suggests
that Ricardian equivalence does not hold.156
Other behavioral responses work in the opposite direction. For
example, taxpayers may not fully account for the future tax increases
likely necessitated by an unsustainable deficit. This is called fiscal
illusion.157 When governments fund expenditures with deficits instead of
tax revenue, taxpayers may feel wealthier than they are, causing them to
save less than they optimally should.158
There are, thus, plausible behavioral responses that will both mitigate
and counteract the intergenerational consequences of an unsustainable
deficit. But, given all the evidence, there is little reason to believe that the
large shock to after-tax income described above would be
intergenerationally neutral after taking into consideration these
behavioral responses.
3. Increasing Prosperity
On average, each generation in the U.S. has been wealthier than its
predecessors.159 Even assuming that all future generations will continue
to be wealthier, if the government raised taxes substantially and abruptly
out of a necessity to reduce the deficit, lifetime after-tax income could be
lower for generations earning income after the tax increase when
compared to generations earning income before the tax increase.160 In
154. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 571-72.
155. The strong assumptions that are required for Ricardian equivalence include (1) taxes have no
substitution effect and (2) households are perfectly rational. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 571-72. The
most famous proponent of Ricardian equivalence is economist Robert Barro. Economist David Ricardo,
for whom the theory is named, was not an adherent. See also SHAVIRO, supra note 48, at 66-70.
156. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 567-69. See also SHAVIRO, supra note 48, at 71-78. Plausible
empirical estimates, however, suggest that household actions might offset a fraction of the
intergenerational consequences of government deficit spending. See ROMER, supra note 26, at 604.
157. See SHAVIRO, supra note 48, at 30.
158. A related concept is crowding out. The larger the size of the government the smaller the size
of the private market. In this sense the public sector can “crowd out” the private one. MANKIW, supra note
48. Even if the government borrows to finance a tax cut (which would have a net zero impact on cash
flows withdrawn from the private market) more government borrowing likely reduces private investment
because lower tax rates increase the incentive to consume, also depressing investment. See ROMER, supra
note 26, at 568-69. The effect will vary depending on whether the tax rates lowered impact capital or labor
income, and there may be a short-run crowd-in effect. But in the long run, higher government debt
decreases private investment. See Nora Traum & Shu‐Chun S. Yang, When Does Government Debt Crowd
Out Investment?, 30 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 24 (2015).
159. See WORLD BANK, GDP PER CAPITA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP
.PCAP.CD.
160. The same would not apply to a gradual increase in taxes. Buchanan, What Do We Owe Future
Generations, supra note 5, at 1284.
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other words, a sufficiently large tax increase would negate the benefit of
rising income for at least some taxpayers.
In sum, neither the benefits of government expenditure nor the possible
behavioral responses to the deficit can justify current deficit levels under
our intergenerational equity definition. Nonetheless, so long as the
government can reduce the deficit to a sustainable level with gradual tax
increases that do not make younger generations worse off than older
generations, there will be no violation of intergenerational equity. At
current debt levels, it is likely that the government could decrease the
deficit in a manner consistent with intergenerational equity. As the debt
grows, however, the likelihood that the government will be able to
decrease the deficit to a sustainable level without violating
intergenerational equity will fall. While it is all but impossible to predict
how long the government has, if the government defers action long
enough, there will be intergenerational inequity.
C. An Example of an Intergenerational Equity Violation
If the government does not address the unsustainable deficit, there are
many possible consequences that will affect the intergenerational
distribution of economic outcomes. These possible consequences include
tax increases, spending cuts, decreased private investment, and a debt
crisis. Any of these outcomes could result in a violation of
intergenerational equity. Here, I focus on the analytically simplest case: a
large and sudden tax increase necessitated by an unsustainable deficit.161
The example below demonstrates a baseline case that could easily be
made to accommodate additional complications and alternative
assumptions.
Consider two taxpayers, Old and Young, who are identical except that
Young was born a generation after Old.162 Both of these taxpayers work
for forty years, then retire. The working years of Young are
contemporaneous with the retirement years of Old—we will call Old’s
working years “Period 1,” Young’s working years and Old’s retirement
years “Period 2,” and Young’s retirement years “Period 3.” Old earns
$4,000,000 in wage income, saves $1,000,000 for retirement, and during
her retirement earns $1,500,000 in investment income. Young earns
$4,600,000 in wage income, saves $1,150,000 for retirement, and during

161. This avoids, among other things, the challenges of assigning the costs and benefits of
government expenditure and the costs of economic crises to different generations.
162. This example does not account for behavioral responses to taxation or the intergenerational
benefits of government spending.
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his retirement earns $1,725,000 in investment income.163
During the working years of Old, the government runs unsustainable
primary deficits. Just as Old retires, the government substantially reduces
the rate at which it borrows. It raises taxes by 100% to make up the
shortfall in funds.164 Assume that before the increase the effective tax rate
on wage income was 30%, and the effective tax rate on investment income
was 10%. After the tax increase, the effective tax rate on wages increases
to 60%, and the effective tax rate on investment income increases to 20%.
The table below shows the incomes and tax burdens for both taxpayers in
all three periods.

Income and Tax Burden (in thousands of dollars)
Period 1

Old income
Old tax burden
Young income
Young tax burden

$4,000
$1,200
-

Period 2

$1,500
$300
$4,600
$2,760

Period 3

$1,725
$345

Lifetime

$5,500
$1,500
$6,325
$3,105

Old’s tax burden is lower because the government financed
expenditures by deficit spending during Old’s working years. The deficit
spending that benefitted Old resulted in a substantially higher tax burden
to Young.165 The tax is sufficiently large to make Old better off than
Young. Old’s lifetime after-tax income is $4,000,000, and Young’s aftertax income is $3,220,000. Despite the fact that Young’s pretax income
was 15% higher, Young’s after-tax income was 20% lower than Old’s.
Under our definition, this is a violation of intergenerational equity.
While it is analytically convenient to divide time into deficit and postdeficit eras and partition taxpayers into deficit and post-deficit cohorts,
some people’s working years will straddle the tax increase. In our
example, there might be Middle whose working years overlap with the

163. Young’s income and savings are 15% higher to reflect the fact that real income has increased
over time. As a simplification, neither Old nor Young earn investment income while working. This
assumption does not negate the essential point of the example.
164. The amount of the tax increase would depend on the severity of the crisis. Even larger tax
increases are plausible.
165. It would be much harder to say what the distributional impacts would be if the government
reduced the deficit using substantial spending cuts.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss3/1

36

Schaffa: The Intergenerational Equity Case for a Wealth Tax

2022]

INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY

771

working years of both Old and Young. Middle would bear a lower tax
burden during the deficit-spending era and bear a higher burden during
the post-deficit era. Middle’s aggregate burden would, therefore, be
somewhere in between Old’s and Young’s—the closer in age Middle
were to Old, the more similar their situations would be.166
IV. THE ONE-TIME WEALTH TAX SOLUTION
Part II demonstrated that the current U.S. government deficit level is
unsustainable. Part III demonstrated that this unsustainable deficit will
have intergenerational consequences. From an intergenerational equity
perspective, the optimal policy would be to gradually eliminate the deficit
using primarily tax increases starting after the pandemic ends. Under the
assumption that the U.S. stays its course and does not gradually eliminate
the deficit, this Part searches for a policy that would counteract the
intergenerational consequences of the unsustainable deficit if a substantial
tax increase must be levied. As it turns out, a one-time wealth tax is a
promising option. This Part also discusses some of the challenges of
taxing wealth and compares a one-time wealth tax to other wealth tax
proposals that are circulating.
A. Taxing the Beneficiaries of the Deficit-Spending Era
To see how a one-time wealth tax would counteract the
intergenerational consequences of an unsustainable deficit, return to our
Old and Young example from Part III. Recall that Old’s working years
coincided with the deficit-spending era, meaning that Old had a
substantially lower tax burden than Young because, right as Old retired,
the government raised taxes.
An income tax cannot undo the intergenerational consequences of the
deficit because, going forward, Young will earn more income than Old.167
166. Taxpayers older than Old would have already consumed some of their wealth and would thus
avoid some of the wealth tax burden. If the era of unsustainable deficits lasted long enough, many of the
benefitting taxpayers would already have died. Some of their wealth, however, may be held by their heirs.
In all likelihood, the unsustainable deficits would have increased the wealth of these heirs, meaning that
a one-time wealth tax would counteract the benefit the heirs derived from those deficits.
167. Old’s income will, however, be investment income, and Young’s income will be largely labor
income. Thus, an increased tax on investment income could extract more revenue from Old. There are
several related reasons why this option is inferior to the wealth tax discussed below. First, the wealth tax
would be much more economically efficient. A one-time wealth tax is not distortionary; an ongoing
investment income tax would be distortionary. Second, Young will still have some investment income,
meaning that an investment income tax will also raises Young’s tax burden. This could be effective
undone by lowering Young’s labor income burden, but would require even higher and thus more
distortionary rates. Third, the investment income tax would have to sunset before Young retired or else
Young would still have a larger lifetime tax burden than Old. This means that there would be complicated
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However, as Period 2 starts, there is one potential tax base which is much
larger for Old than Young—wealth. Because Old set aside income as she
worked, she now has $1,000,000 in savings. Young, on the other hand,
has just started work and therefore has no savings. An ongoing wealth tax
would eventually place a burden on Young, but a one-time wealth tax
would raise revenue without placing a burden on Young, thereby
counteracting the intergenerational equity violation of the unsustainable
deficit.168
A one-time wealth tax would also raise revenue from Middle. The
revenue raised by a one-time wealth tax from Middle would be less than
the amount raised from Old because Middle would have less wealth when
the tax was levied. If there were several Middles with ages spanning the
range between Old’s and Young’s, the one-time wealth tax would raise
more revenue from those closer to Old’s age and less from those closer to
Young’s. And since the Middles closer in age to Old would have
benefitted more from the government’s deficit spending, the burden of the
wealth tax on each taxpayer would be proportional to the benefit she
received from the deficit spending. This example corresponds nicely to
the data: for most people, the age-profile of wealth is hump-shaped with
peak wealth at retirement, increasing wealth before retirement as incomeearners save and decreasing wealth after retirement as retirees consume
down their wealth.169
While a one-time wealth tax would counteract the intergenerational
consequences of unsustainable deficit spending, it would be rough justice.
Returning to our example, imagine two Olds identical in every way
(including income) except that one consumed more and the other saved
more. Both experienced the benefit of deficit spending, but the Old with
more savings would have a higher wealth tax bill.
A more complicated version of this issue arises when the era of
unsustainable deficits is long, meaning that many of the beneficiaries of
the deficit spending era have already died at the time of the wealth tax. If
these deceased beneficiaries used their lower tax burden solely to increase
their consumption, the efficacy of a wealth tax as an instrument of

timing issues, made all the more difficult if there were millions of taxpayers all with somewhat different
circumstances.
168. The distributional impact of a one-time wealth tax has often been studied as an implicit onetime wealth tax when a new consumption tax is levied. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Distributional Effects
of Fundamental Tax Revisions, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1996); John W. Diamond & George
Zodrow, Consumption Tax Reform: Changes in Business Equity and Housing Prices in FUNDAMENTAL
TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 227, 227-28 (2008); Alan Auerbach, The Choice
Between Income and Consumption Taxes: A Primer in INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
FINANCE 13, 32-34 (2008).
169. James B. Davies & Anthony E. Shorrocks, The Distribution of Wealth in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INCOME DISTRIBUTION605, 615, 645 (A. B. Atkinson & F Bourguignon eds. 1999).
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intergenerational equity is reduced—the beneficiaries of the deficit
spending have gone beyond the reach of the wealth tax. If, however, these
deceased beneficiaries passed at least some of the benefit on to their heirs
who retain it as wealth, then the one-time wealth tax will still be able to
counteract the intergenerational consequences of the deficit. Consider, for
example, a Young who inherited substantial wealth. He also benefited
from the unsustainable deficit because the low tax rates allowed the
wealth that he inherited to grow more than it would have had the
government run a sustainable deficit. A wealth tax counteracts this
Young’s benefit from the unsustainable deficit.
To be clear, a one-time wealth tax likely cannot solve the unsustainable
deficit problem because it will raise less revenue than the present value of
all future deficits, assuming no other tax changes.170 An ongoing tax
increase will be necessary to make the government’s finances sustainable.
The one-time wealth tax simply raises some revenue from those who most
benefited from the deficit-spending era and thus limits the
intergenerational impact of the unsustainable deficit.
As with all of its revenue, the government should allocate the receipts
from the one-time wealth tax to whatever expenditures most improve its
citizens’ wellbeing.171 If the government is at or near the economic limit
of its debt, some of the wealth tax revenue should be used to pay off
government debt. This will create fiscal space for the government, and it
may decrease the required size of the ongoing tax increase or at the very
least allow the ongoing tax increase to be implemented more gradually.172
Beyond that, the proceeds of the wealth tax might be used for large onetime projects, set aside to support ongoing government expenditures, or
distributed to citizens, evenly or progressively.173
To perfectly undo the intergenerational consequences of an
unsustainable deficit, a tax regime would have to collect from each person
what she would have paid in taxes in the counterfactual universe in which
the government had run only sustainable deficits. Even if this were
possible, it would only undo the transfer; it would not undo all the
behavioral responses to the transfer, and it would not even begin to
170. A sufficiently large wealth tax may be possible (in the sense that there exists enough wealth)
but is well beyond the political limits of what could be collected. Moreover, the incentives to deficit spend
would change once the government had raised such a large fund.
171. Suggesting an estimate for the correct size of the wealth tax is difficult. The chief challenge,
although certainly not the only one, would be forecasting when the substantial future tax increase would
take place.
172. If the wealth tax raises sufficient revenue to reduce the government debt to the point at which
the interest rate on the debt is below the GDP growth rate, then (assuming deficits remained small), the
government’s fiscal space would increase as the debt-to-GDP ratio eroded over time.
173. A wealth tax followed by a lumpsum rebate would still counteract the intergenerational
consequences of the unsustainable deficit by taxing those who most benefitted from the deficit spending
but distributing proceeds to everyone.
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contemplate all the issues raised by who benefits from government
expenditures. A time machine, it would seem, presents the only certain
way to perfectly undo the intergenerational consequences. Nonetheless,
after an era of unsustainable deficits, a one-time wealth tax would
counteract the intergenerational consequences of an unsustainable deficit.
It is the best available option to restore intergenerational equity if a
prolonged unsustainable deficit were to violate intergenerational equity.
B. Wealth Tax Policy Considerations
The previous Section showed that a one-time wealth tax would undo at
least some of the intergenerational inequity of an unsustainable deficit.
That alone does not make it good policy. This Section addresses the
broader question of whether a one-time wealth tax would be a sound
proposal. It does so by applying the standard tax policy framework of
administrability, efficiency, and fairness to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of an intergenerational equity enhancing wealth tax.174 It then
briefly compares the intergenerational equity enhancing wealth tax
suggested in this Article to the wealth taxes proposed by Senators Sanders
and Warren.
1. Administrability
The greatest challenge with a wealth tax of any variety is
administration, which gives rise to four problems. First, while some
assets, notably cash and exchange-traded securities, have easily
ascertainable values, many assets, including art and other collectables, are
difficult to valuate. Thus, determining a taxpayer’s wealth and her
resulting tax liability will generally pose considerable challenges. 175
Second, asset holders may not have cash on hand to pay the tax.176 One
possible solution is to offer taxpayers a payment plan, but a wealthy
174. Administrability, efficiency, and fairness are all good things—more of each is better than less.
If a policymaker can, for example, find a way to increase the efficiency of a tax regime without lessening
the fairness or the administrability of the regime, that policymaker should do so. Policymaking becomes
more difficult when at the policy frontier, in which case making an improvement in any of the three criteria
would require a retrogression of one or both of the others. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 49, at 415..
There is also some debate over whether a wealth tax would be constitutional under the United States’
Constitution. See, e.g., Erik Jensen, Is a Tax on Wealth Constitutional?, 36 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS 79
(2019); Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax, 93 INDIANA
L. J. 111 (2018). I take no position on the constitutionality issue here.
175. See Scheuer & Slemrod, supra note 1, at 209. The challenge becomes even greater for ongoing
wealth taxes because taxpayers will have an incentive to move their wealth into assets that are difficult to
value. See id. at 221. An innovative solution to this problem would allow the government to purchase any
asset at a small premium over the valuation proposed by the taxpayer. See id. at 222.
176. Id. at 209.
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taxpayer who holds little cash must, eventually, sell some of her assets to
settle her tax liability. A third problem is tax sheltering.177 Wealth taxes
fall, unsurprisingly, predominantly on the wealthy. Typically, wealthy
taxpayers are best able to afford the costs of tax sheltering—they can pay
for the transaction costs of sheltering their wealth and a legal defense
should they require it.178 Fourth, the administrative apparatus required to
implement a wealth tax does not already exist and would have to be
installed.179 These drawbacks should not be disregarded, but they have
not precluded other countries from enacting wealth taxes in the past that
have successfully raised revenue.180
A possible solution to these administrative issues for a one-time wealth
tax (but not an ongoing one) would be to implement an ongoing
consumption tax, which would implicitly levy a one-time wealth tax. Any
time a new consumption tax is introduced or an existing consumption tax
rate is increased, there is an implicit one-time wealth tax because a tax on
consumption decreases the value of wealth as it lowers the buying power
of wealth.181 It is well understood that the one-time wealth tax implicitly
levied by a consumption tax falls on wealthier and older taxpayers,
ensuring intergenerational equity benefits similar to an actual one-time
wealth tax.182 This consumption tax could be designed to be highly
progressive and address the administrative problems inherent in a wealth
tax because a consumption tax is levied on market transactions.183 Market

177. Id. at 221-22.
178. In a randomized control trial, when taxpayers were told that their tax returns would be
scrutinized, low- and middle-income taxpayers reported more income, but high-income taxpayers reported
less income. See Joel Slemrod et al., Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455 (2001). A possible explanation for this
result is that high-income taxpayers may see filing returns as an opening offer in a negotiation with the
tax authority.
179. See Scheuer & Slemrod, supra note 1, at 222-23.
180. See id. at 210-214.
181. The implicit one-time wealth tax is the present value of the tax on future consumption derived
from current wealth. Louis Kaplow, Capital Levies and Transition to a Consumption Tax in
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 112 (2008). Some prominent economists believe that
most of the benefit of a consumption tax is the implicit capital levy. Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J.
Kotlikoff & Jonathan Skinner, The Efficiency Gains from Dynamic Tax Reform, 24 INT’L ECON. REV. 81,
81 (1983); ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY, 4, 79 (1987).
182. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Distributional Effects of Fundamental Tax Revisions, 33 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1419 (1996); Diamond & Zodrow, supra note 168, at 227-28; Auerbach, supra note 168 at 3234.
183. As the famous tax scholar William Andrews said, “[t]here is some tendency to think that a
consumption-type tax would be more regressive or less progressive than an accretion-type tax because
consumption is a declining fraction of income as income increases. In part that notion reflects a habit of
thought about general sales taxes; but a consumption-type personal income tax is a personal tax with
graduated rates and personal exemptions that can be adjusted to whatever levels are thought to be
appropriate.” William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1113, 1174 (1974).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2022

41

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 1

776

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

transactions supply valuations and often cash to pay the tax.184 It also
makes tax sheltering somewhat more difficult.185
2. Efficiency
The most substantial advantage of a one-time wealth tax over an
ongoing wealth tax is its efficiency. Ongoing wealth taxes reduce the
incentive to hold wealth because the more wealth a person holds, the
higher that person’s tax burden is.186 Empirical studies have often found
substantial behavioral responses to ongoing wealth taxes.187 If a wealth
tax reduced the incentive to save, it would decrease investment, which in
turn would lower wages and decrease the rate of economic growth.188
Therefore, ongoing wealth taxes may have substantial economic
efficiency costs.
One-time wealth taxes, on the other hand, are remarkably efficient
taxes.189 The key difference is that one-time wealth taxes do not change
the incentive to hold wealth much if at all.190 If a taxpayer has little notice
of a one-time wealth tax, she cannot respond to it by liquidating
investments, changing her portfolio of assets, or hiding her wealth.191 But
if she faces an ongoing wealth tax, she is likely to respond to the tax
eventually even if not in its first year. Thus, efficiency weighs heavily in

184. Id. at 1141, 1145.
185. Id.
186. See Huaqun Li & Karl Smith, Analysis of Sen. Warren and Sen. Sanders’ Wealth Tax Plans,
691
TAX
FOUNDATION
FISCAL
FACT
(Jan.
2020),
https://files.taxfoundation.org
/20200127123048/Analysis-of-Sen.-Warren-and-Sen.-Sanders%E2%80%99-Wealth-Tax-Plans.pdf.
187. In some cases, these behavioral responses had real consequences—the wealth tax decreased
total wealth. In other cases, the behavioral response was attributed mostly to activity that resulted in less
reporting of wealth but not lower real wealth balances. See Scheuer & Slemrod, supra note 1, at 219. If
the responses are real and total wealth decreases, a wealth tax would have a detrimental impact on the
economy. See Huaqun Li & Karl Smith, Analysis of Sen. Warren and Sen. Sanders’ Wealth Tax Plans,
691 TAX FOUNDATION FISCAL FACT (Jan. 2020), https://files.taxfoundation.org/202
00127123048/Analysis-of-Sen.-Warren-and-Sen.-Sanders%E2%80%99-Wealth-Tax-Plans.pdf.
188. See Scheuer & Slemrod, supra note 1, at 219-20. Wealth taxes may also have a detrimental
effect on entrepreneurial risk-taking and induce wealth taxpayers to renounce their citizenship and shift
wealth abroad. Id.
189. See id. at 224.
190. Id.
191. The efficiency of a one-time capital levy and an ongoing wealth tax are very different because
taxes induce behavioral responses when they are anticipated. In particular, anticipation of future capital
levies will discourage income production and saving. See Barry Eichengreen, The Capital Levy in Theory
and Practice, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3096, 1989), available at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w3096 and Kaplow, supra note 181, at 114-15. The less taxpayers are able
to anticipate a tax, the more efficient the tax will be. If taxpayers are able to adjust their wealth holdings
before the tax, it will be less efficient. As a general rule, retroactive taxes are efficient if they can avoid
anticipation and repetition issues. See Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 265 (1993).
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favor of a one-time wealth tax compared to ongoing wealth taxes and, for
similar reasons, compared to ongoing income and consumption taxes.
3. Fairness
The greatest fairness advantage that a one-time wealth tax has, as this
Article argues, is that it can restore intergenerational equity. However, it
may be the case that, although the intergenerational consequences caused
by an unsustainable deficit are unfair, there is a countervailing fairness
norm precluding the correction of that unfairness. The cohorts that have
benefitted from the unsustainable deficit may now have a reliance interest
in their wealth.192 No one knows what future tax law will be, and few
seem to be making decisions anticipating a future law that will counteract
the deficit-spending intergenerational transfer. If this is the case, a large
one-time wealth tax could be a harmful shock, particularly for those who
are older and have less flexibility when it comes to financial planning.193
But this is not an especially difficult harm to remedy. An exemption or,
more generally, a progressive tax rate structure would be the best path
between these two fairness concerns. Progressivity would ensure that the
wealth tax and tax increase would place a relatively small burden on those
who have the least.194
As a final point, there are two important differences between a wealth
tax designed to counteract the intergenerational consequences of an
unsustainable deficit and those proposed by Sanders and Warren. Both of
these differences arise because, for a wealth tax to counteract
intergenerational inequity, its burden must correspond to the
intergenerational consequences of unsustainable deficit spending. First,
as discussed above, an intergenerational equity enhancing wealth tax must
be one-time and not ongoing, unlike the Senators’ proposals.195 This
192. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE 2 (2000); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions:
The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 74-79 (1977). More generally,
beyond reliance interests, there are horizontal equity, vertical equity, and contractarian notions that might
impact the analysis. See Id. Political economy considerations may also come into play. See J. Mark
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz
and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1162 (1989); see also DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE
(2000); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government
Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1996).
193. The burden of an adverse financial shock can be spread over many more years by the young
than the old because, simply put, the old have fewer years over which to smooth costs.
194. Outside of the tax system, increased Social Security payments would also prevent
impoverishing the elderly. Increasing minimum Social Security payments and expanding eligibility would
help ensure that the wealth tax would not leave any taxpayer without the means to consume necessities.
195. That is at least the case for the specific examples discussed here. In a more complicated model,
in which there were heterogeneous path-dependencies for the accumulation of wealth, an ongoing wealth
tax might be able to counter intergenerational inequity. There is no obvious evidence that the necessary
path-dependencies exist.
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ensures that the burden falls predominantly on the cohorts that benefitted
from the unsustainable deficits. Second, it requires both a broader base
than Sanders and Warren propose and also likely much higher rates to
raise sufficient revenue to mitigate the intergenerational consequences of
deficit spending.196
CONCLUSION
Long-term intergenerational equity is very difficult to achieve. As far
as the government budget is concerned, so long as there is fiscal space,
there exists an incentive to deficit spend—politicians have an incentive to
keep taxes low and keep spending high. Beyond a certain point, as the
government uses up fiscal space, it generates costs that will be passed on
to future taxpayers. In short, the interests of various cohorts of taxpayers
do not align. There is no perfect solution to this incentive problem, but
this Article proposes a novel wealth tax counteraction to an era of
unsustainable deficit. And while the analysis here focuses on the
intergenerational consequences of an unsustainable deficit, it would apply
equally well to other contexts with misaligned intergenerational
incentives, including, for example, climate change. Indeed, a one-time
wealth tax has important intergenerational equity potential that should be
further studied.

196. The details of Senator Sanders’ plan may be found here: Tax on Extreme Wealth, BERNIE
SANDERS OFFICIAL WEBSITE, https://berniesanders.com/issues/tax-extreme-wealth/. (last visited Feb. 20,
2021). The details of Senator Warren’s may be found here: Ultra-Millionaire Tax, WARREN DEMOCRATS,
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/ultra-millionaire-tax (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). Sanders and Warren’s
wealth taxes would raise revenue only from those with wealth exceeding $32 million and $50 million,
respectively. A wealth tax designed to restore intergenerational equity might still have a substantial
exemption—for example, applying only to taxpayers with wealth above $2 million—but it would need to
apply to substantially more taxpayers for two reasons. First, there are several taxpayers who benefited
from deficit spending and have less than $32 million in wealth. Second, to counteract the intergenerational
consequences of deficit spending, the wealth tax would need to raise trillions of dollars, which would
require a larger rate and base than the Senators’ proposals. Any comparison between a one-time and an
ongoing wealth tax must contend with the difficulties of comparing a lumpsum payment and a stream of
future cashflows. Present value is clearly the correct tool to apply, but its application requires assumptions
about the correct discount rate, among other things. The Sanders and Warren proposals are estimated to
raise $2.6 trillion and $2.2 trillion over ten years, respectively. See Li & Smith, supra note 186. Assuming
a discount rate of 5%, the present value of a wealth tax that raised $240 billion per year would be $4.8
trillion. A wealth tax designed to counteract the intergenerational consequences of the unsustainable
deficit would likely have to be larger.
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